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1INTRODUCTION
When linguists and grammarians discuss tense, they
usually consider verbs and certain of their inflections.
When philosophers discuss tense, however, they are
apparently concerned with something else. It is not al-
ways clear, exactly, what philosophers have in mind on
these occasions, though their concern seems to be with
larger linguistic units like sentences and statements.
Moreover, philosophers usually contrast the class of
tensed expressions with the class of tenseless expressions,
and this distinction is customarily held to support
additional distinctions of philosophical interest, con-
cerning, for example, ontological commitments, conceptual
schemes, the passage of time, temporal becoming, and
perspicuous languages.
The philosopher's interest in tense thus appears
to extend beyond issues concerning the morphological
transformations of verbs in certain languages. To
some extent, of course, the linguist is also interested
in more than the mechanics of inflecting verbs. Some
work has been done, for example, on the propriety of
certain inflections over others in various situations.
1
1For example, Huddleston: [H2], Lakoff: [LI].
But with respect to identifying tensed sentences, the
2typical view of the linguist is that sentences whose
verbs do not exhibit tense inflections—that is, verbs
which are not morphologically altered in specifiable
ways—are not tensed. This claim is frequently advanced,
for example, with respect to Finnish sentences about
future states of affairs and to all sentences of
2Chinese. It is widely held that Finnish, for instance,
2See Y. R. Chao, A Grammar of Spoken Chinese
,
Berkeley:
University of California Press ,~1968; M. Aaltio, Finnish
for Foreigners
,
Helsinki, 1966; M. Lehtinen, Basic Course
in Finnish
,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965*
simply has no future tense, since sentences of the language
which appear to be about the future contain non-inflected
verbs. This is not to be understood as the claim that
Finns cannot talk about the future. It is simply the
claim that sentences used for that purpose are typically
not tensed.
The English language, by contrast, seems to be a
tensed language according to the linguist's criterion.
Most occurrences of verbs in the language are inflected
forms of some infinitive. Thus the verb 'to drink'
rarely occurs simply as an infinitive, unless it belongs
to a verb phrase in which it is preceded by an inflected
verb. When the verb 'to drink' is not part of such a
verb phrase
,
it usually occurs in one of its standard
tense inflections, like 'drinks', 'is drinking', 'drank ,
3’has drunk’, 'will drink', etc.
What the philosopher has to say about tense, however,
is not nearly so easy to summarize . It is generally
acknowledged, though, that tenseless sentences may
contain what linguists would regard as tensed verbs.
For example, most philosophers who have concerned them-
selves with the tensed/tenseless distinction would regard
as tenseless sentences
(1) Red is a color
(2) All bachelors are unmarried
even though the infinitive 'to be' occurs in an inflected
form in each sentence. These verbs are usually regarded
by philosophers as tenseless in such contexts. Very
roughly, the idea here is that these verbs are deprived
of temporal significance or temporal import in these
contexts, and should be distinguished from morphemically
identical verbs not so deprived, such as the inflections
of 'to be' in
(3) John is drunk
(4-) The guests are drunk
Since philosophers interested in tensed and tense-
less discourse represent a variety of views on the
nature of language , they quite naturally do not all
regard the same linguistic units as tensed or tenseless.
Even though many consider verbs to be tensed or tenseless,
there is little agreement (and discussion) concerning
which larger kinds of linguistic units can have these
properties. For some philosophers, sentences are said
to be tensed or tenseless, while others place the burden
on statements, propositions, assertions, or utterances.
To simplify matters, and also to avoid relying on
what many philosophers regard as questionable entities
—
namely, statements or propositions—I will restrict my
discussion to sentences, tensed and tenseless. And
for ease of exposition I will understand the various
authors whose views I examine as also discussing
sentences. In some respects, of course, there are
important differences between sentences and statements
or propositions, as the distinction is usually drawn.
But for the present purposes there are no important
differences, since the properties in virtue of which
statements or propositions are said to be tensed are
properties that we might also comfortably ascribe to
what I take to be sentences. If I followed some
philosophers in taking a sentence to be nothing more
than a string of symbols which has neither sense nor
truth-value unless it is used in making a statement,
then there would, indeed, be some differences worth
mentioning. But the linguistic units I want to call
tensed are more like sentence-tokens than sentence—
types .
5Henceforth a sentence will be understood as being
an instance of a concatenation of morphemes whose visual
or sound pattern may be replicated on various occasions,
and to which logicians would assign truth-values (thus
ruling out words ) on those occasions.
It should be obvious, moreover, that what I am
calling a sentence is really only a declarative sentence.
But it is clear from the literature that philosophers
distinguishing tensed from tenseless sentences are
concerned only with declarative sentences. Again, the
philosopher and linguist appear to part company, since
linguists would call interrogative s , for example, tensed,
3
so long as their verbs are inflected.
^Actually, there may be a perfectly good philosophical
sense in which some interrogatives are tensed. This
matter will be given some attention in Chapter IV.
For the philosopher, then, the investigation of
tensed language is more than an examination of surface
grammars. Let us now consider some respects in which
the philosophical distinction between tensed and tense-
less discourse is held to be important.
6CHAPTER I
THE INSTABILITY OF TENSE
The Proposals to Revise Ordinary Language
The distinction between tensed and tenseless
sentences is pretty much a philosophical invention, and
not a matter about which we are likely to have strong
pre-analytic intuitions. But it is not very difficult
to identify what seems to have seized the interest of
philosophers concerned with the distinction. A survey
of the literature on the subject reveals that—at least
since Aristotle
—
philosophers have been impressed by
problems involving the temporal relativity of certain
kinds of sentences. For example, the sentences
(5) John was drunk
(6) Mary is frowning
appear able to change in truth-value with time. (5)
is true only after a time at which John is drunk. . But
at some time prior to John's first case of inebriation
it would be false. (6), on the other hand, is true only
at those times at which Mary is frowning. It would thus
appear that the truth—value of (6) could change quite
often. If Mary frowns several times each day, (6)
would be true at those times but false whenever she is
not frowning.
Other sentences, however, seem unaffected by the
7vagaries of time. In addition to analytic sentences like
(1) Red is a color
(2) All bachelors are unmarried
sentences from mathematics, like
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4-
(8) The sum of the interior angles of a
Euclidean triangle is 180 degrees
and sentences ordering events according to the earlier-
later relation—for example, sentences of the form
(9) E^ is earlier than (later than, simultaneous
with) E
2
appear to be true (or false) at every time if true (or
false) at some time. Quite obviously, the truth or
falsity of (7) and (8)—and perhaps of most sentences
taken from axiomatizable theories—does not seem to
rest on temporal considerations. It is easy to see,
therefore, why such sentences appear to have stable
truth-values
,
unlike (5) (6). The truth-value of
sentences like (9) would seem to be stable for a some-
what different reason. If E1 is related to
E
2
in the
manner described by (9), and if these events are non-
recurrent (which we may henceforth assume all events
to be, unless stipulated otherwise), then these two
events are so related regardless of our temporal lo-
cation with respect to them. If E^ precedes E2 , this
relation holds whether or not the two events are both
8in our past, or both in our future, or whether they are
temporally separated by the present (i.e., if E, is in
our past and E^ is in our future).
Not all writers on the subject of tensed and tense-
less sentences like to describe the difference between
(5)“(6) and (7 )— (9) as a difference concerning shifting
truth-values
,
since they prefer to regard sentences of
any kind as having stable truth-values (if they have truth
Zj.
values at all). But the difference, however it is des-
2l
:
See, for example, Goodman: [G13], Quine: [Ql], [Q2], [Q3]
cribed, is widely held to be of considerable importance.
As we shall see
,
some philosophers regard having an
unstable truth-value as a unique property of tensed
sentences, and think, moreover, that tensed sentences
may be distinguished from tenseless sentences on this
basis, while other philosophers regard unstable truth-
values (or the appearance of truth-value instability)
as a symptom of a more subtle distinction between tensed
and tenseless sentences.
Many philosophers, in any case, regard ordinary
language as failing to provide a rigorous enough medium
for doing philosophy. One of its alleged defects is
the (perhaps only apparent) instability of truth-values
of its tensed sentences. Another related feature of
ordinary language , which I will discuss later in more
9detail
,
is the imprecision with which we can successfully
communicate—and in particular, agree or disagree—by
using tensed sentences. The sorts of situations felt to
be disturbing may be suggested by the following brief
examples
.
Suppose that at one time you say ’John cpd * and
then later I say ’John cpd'. If tensed sentences contain
some kind of implicit reference to the time of utterance,
as some philosophers have maintained, we seem to be
making different claims, thus ruling out any chance for
agreement short of simultaneous agreement. If tensed
sentences do not contain a tacit time-reference, how-
ever, we might be able to make the same claim at dif-
ferent times, even though the sentences we utter have
different truth-values
,
as in the case where John had
not yet cpd when you said 'John cpd', but where he had
already cpd when I said 'John cpd*.
From the above examples we can get a kind of
rough picture of what tensed discourse is supposed to
be. Our intuitions are, of course, aided by our working
familiarity with such discourse, even though we do not
customarily mark it off from another style of language.
We are much less likely to comprehend initially
what a tenseless language is, although we can grasp
that on occasion we use sentences regarded as tenseless
10
by philosophers. Many philosophers^ have advocated the
For example, Ayer: [A7], [A8], Duncan-Jones
: [D3],
Goodman: [G13], Russell: [R7], [R9], [RIO], Quine:
[Ql], [Q2], [Q33, Smart: [S10], [Sll], [S13], [S14].
use of a tenseless language
,
part of the purpose of which
would be to exhibit clearly and precisely the sense of
ordinary tensed sentences. The reason for constructing
this revisionary tenseless language is that ordinary
language is confusing and complicated in a manner in-
appropriate for science, logic, or good philosophy.
Thus tensed language is abandoned in favor of a more
perspicuous and elegant—though artificial—tenseless
mode of expression. As Quine puts it,
Our ordinary language shows a tiresome bias
in its treatment of time.... This bias is itself
an inelegance, or breach of theoretical sim-
plicity. .. .Hence in fashioning canonical no-
tation it is usual to drop tense distinctions.
([Q2], p. 170)
In a similar vein, Smart writes
[Tenseless language] fits our ordinary way
of talking much more closely to our scientific
way of talking [than does tensed language] and
it avoids unnecessary mystification. ([Sll],
p. 140)
[Tensed language] causes us to see the uni-
verse very much from the perspective of our
position in space-time. Our view of the world
thus acquires a certain anthropocentricity
which can best be eliminated by passing to a
tenseless language ... [with which] we make
quite explicit the reference to our particu-
lar position in space-time. Once we recognise
this anthropocentric reference and bring it
out into the open we are less likely to Pro-
ject it on to the universe. ([Sll], p. 142)
11
For all the similarity of motive enjoyed by those
philosophers advocating the translation of tensed dis-
course into a tenseless discourse, there is some dis-
agreement over the proper method of translation. It
is not clear whether the various methods are incompati-
ble, but their results sometimes differ significantly,
as will be shown later on.
One of the most prominent views about the structure
of a suitable artificial tenseless language is that
tenses are replaced in it by tenseless verbs, token-
reflexive expressions, and the earlier-later relation.
...Such a sentence as 'he will run' can be
replaced by 'he runs at some future time' (with
tenseless ' runs
' ) and hence by 'he runs later
than this utterance'. Similarly, 'he runs'
means 'he runs (tenseless) simultaneous with
this utterance', and 'he ran' means 'he runs
(tenseless) earlier than this utterance'.
([Sll], p. 134)
'Randy ran' tells us not only who did what
but also when, i.e., prior to the period of
production of the sentence itself.
A verb in the present tense normally in-
dicates a period within which the verb is
produced, while a verb in the future tense
normally indicates the period after its own
production. ([G13], P» 365)
...No statement is as such about the past.
It may describe an event which is earlier than
the occasion of its being expressed, and it
may itself refer to this temporal relation-
ship. ([A7J, PP» 160-161)
Quine's variant of this view abandons token-
reflexives in favor of other temporal indicators.
12
'I will not do it again' becomes 'I do not
do it after now'
,
where 'do' is taken tense-
lessly and the future force of 'will' is
translated into a phrase 'after now', com-
parable to 'west of here'. ([Q2], p. 170)
And similar to Quine's view is that of Duncan-Jones
.
Instead of
(1) Brutus killed Caesar
we might say
(2) Brutus killed Caesar at T
in which the present tense is used in a time-
less sense. But (2) is not an adequate ren-
dering of (1) unless we explain the meaning
of 'T'. The obvious way to do this is as
follows
•
(3) For some t, Brutus kills Caesar at t,
and t is before now
([D3], p. 22)
Moreover, nearly all these authors advocate the
replacement of tenses by dates.
The temporal position of the speaker,
relatively to the event described, which is
shown by this use of the present, past, or
future tense, could itself be characterized
by being explicitly assigned a date. ([A73,
p. 160)
...A certain 'ran' is translated by any
'runs [tenseless] on Jan. 7* 1948 at
noon E.S.T. '
.
([6133, P. 569)
A physicist will not say... 'A meteor is
visible now', but 'A meteor was visible at
8h. 43m. G.M.T.', and in this statement 'was'
is intended to be without tense. ([R73, p« 102)
...Any casual statement of inconsequential
fact can be filled out into an eternal sentence
by supplying names and dates and cancelling
the tenses of verbs. Corresponding to 'It is
raining' and 'You owe me ten dollars' we have
the eternal sentence 'It rains in Boston, Mass.,
on July 15, 1968' and 'Bernard J. Ortcutt owes
W. V. Quine ten dollars on July 15, 1968',
13
where 'rains' and 'owes' are to be thought of
now as tenseless. ([Q3], p. 13)
I have not yet explained what a tenseless verb is
supposed to be
,
although a few clues were provided in
the Introduction. For the moment, however, let us grant
that the idea of a tenseless verb is intelligible., since
nothing as yet depends on the employment of this notion.
Moreover, the topic of tenseless verbs will later be
given a more detailed treatment. Henceforth, whenever
it would be helpful to remind the reader that a certain
occurrence of a verb is supposed to be tenseless, the
verb will be bracketed. In this way we can avoid con-
fusing tenseless occurrences of verbs with the tensed
verbs from which they are morphemically indistinguishable
.
Perhaps, then, the diversity of de-tensing tech-
niques can best be summarized as follows. The tensed
sentences
(10) The glass was full
(11) The glass is full
(12) The glass will be full
would be translated into sentences having at least one
of the following two forms. The first tenseless pattern
of analysis is explicitly endorsed in [D3] and less
obviously in [Q2], [S10], [Sll], and [S12].
(10') (Et)(t [is] earlier than & the
glass [is] full at t)
(11') (Et)(t [is] simultaneous with &
the glass [is] full at t)
14-
(12') (Et)(t [is] later than & the
glass [is] full at t)
In (10')-(12') the first conjunct in each expression
serves to locate the time of the event which is tense-
lessly said to occur then. The blank in this conjunct
may be filled-in by the token-reflexive 'this utterance',
or by the phrase 'the time of this utterance', by 'now',
or by a date. Or, the entire first conjunct may be
supplanted by a phrase of the form 't = [date] '
.
. The second pattern of analysis is alluded to in
the other works cited, though some of the authors (e.g.,
Russell, Smart, Quine) seem to endorse both patterns,
or perhaps fail to discriminate between the two.
(10") The glass's being full [is] earlier
than
(11") The glass's being full [is] simultaneous
with
(12") The glass's being full [is] later than
Here, the blank gets filled-in as before. Moreover, if
a date is used, any one of (10)-(12) may be expressed
by
(13 ) The glass [is] full on (or at) [date
]
Although none of the authors discussed here deals
with the issue, it seems compatible with their various
positions, and intuitively plausible to boot, to say
that any sentence resisting translation according to
one of the patterns of analysis on the grounds that it
15
has no temporal significance or import, is tenseless
already. Thus
(1) Red is a color
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4-
would not be re-expressed with the aid of such devices
as quantifying over times, or mentioning dates or par-
ticular occurrences (like utterances), since, roughly,
these temporal qualifications would either be super-
fluous and irrelevant, or simply too restrictive, since
the claims advanced by such sentences are not to be
understood as being true of particular stretches of
time, to the exclusion of other times (if they are to be
understood as being true of any times at all).
There may be, as we shall see shortly, some sen-
tences that resist translation according to these tense-
less patterns of analysis, but in these cases it will
not be due to the irrelevance to these expressions of
temporal information in general, or to the restrictions
to certain periods of time placed on their truth-con-
ditions. Let us call any sentence devoid of temporal
significance an atemporal sentence . The intuitively
plausible view, then, which these authors seem to en-
dorse, is that all atemporal sentences are tenseless.
It should be mentioned that Russell seems to offer
6See [R7], [R9].
16
an analysis of tensed sentences in terms of the logically
proper name 'this', which is supposed to denote a sense-
datum experienced by the speaker. All egocentric words,
he says, are definable in terras of 'this', and ’now'
means 'the time of this'. Both Gale and Rosenberg^ seem
^See [G5] and [R6].
to think that this proposed analysis is a technique for
de-tensing language, and indeed, Russell's view seems
superficially similar to the token-reflexive analysis
explained above. But Russell does not claim that
tensed sentences analyzed by 'this' are tenseless.
The language of the physicist, however, _is tenseless.
This language, Russell says, does without egocentric
words entirely, including 'this', and substitutes dates
for temporal indicators and latitude and longitude
O
coordinates for spatial indicators. Russell's analysis
8See [R7], pp. 102-109, and [R93, pp. 84-93.
of egocentric particulars is thus not germane to the
present discussion.
q
Many philosophers y acknowledge that some form of
^For example, Broad: [B4], Gale: [G2], [G3]» [G4-], [G5]»
[G9], Geach: [Gil], Prior: [P2] , [P33, [P93 , Rosenberg:
[R6]
,
Sellars: [S3J, [S4]
,
Strawson: [SI?]*
one or both of the aforementioned tenseless patterns of
17
analysis is tenseless, but they do not hold that the
tenseless sentences analyze, translate, or otherwise
elucidate the tensed ones. Usually, the issue here is
either that tensed discourse is more basic (in some sense)
than tenseless discourse, or that there is an asymmetry
of information between the two. In the latter case,
tensed sentences are held to express everything expres-
sable by tenseless sentences plus something else—usually
the passage of time.
Geach defends the first point of view in the follow-
ing way.
Predicates .. .in which dates are mentioned,
are a long way above the most fundamental level
of temporal discourse.
...It is definitely wrong to analyse an
unsophisticated simultaneity proposition, like
'Peter was writing a letter and (at the same
time) Jenny was practising the piano', in terms
of what happened at some one time t . . . .On the
contrary, telling the time depends on knowing
some of these primitive simultaneity propo-
sitions to be true....A physicist may protest
that he simply cannot understand 'at the same
time' except via elaborate stipulations about
observing instruments; his protest may be dis-
missed out of hand, for he could not describe
the set-up of any apparatus except by certain
conditions' having to be fulfilled together ,
i.e., simultaneously, by the parts of the
apparatus. ([Gil], pp. 184-185)
The claim that tensed and tenseless discourse convey
different information has been supported as follows by
• • .Everything that can be said in a tenseless
language can be said in a tensed one , but not
Gale
18
vice versa . E.G., if I tell you that Y is now
present and X is past, it would be pointlessly
redundant for you to ask me if X is (tenseless-
ly) earlier thanY; whereas, if instead I had
told you that X is (tenselessly) earlier than
Y it would not be redundant for you to ask if
Y is now present. Similarly, if I tell you
yhat X and Y are now present I have ipso facto
told you that they are (tenselessly) simuT^
taneous, but if I tell you instead that they
are (tenselessly) simultaneous I have not
iPSQ iacto informed you of their being present
now. TEGJT, p. 356)
The presumption in moves such as Gale's seems to be
that too much is lost in the shift to a tenseless dis-
course for it to be a valuable vehicle for communication.
Ib is often important to know
,
in other words
, whether
events are past, present, or future.
Another popular dispute has arisen over the scope
of tenseless discourse. Prior and Gale, for instance,
argue that some crucial tensed sentences are inexpres-
sable in a tenseless language. One such sentence,
according to Prior, is
10See [P2]
,
pp. 11-12.
(14) Eventually all speech will have come to
an end
This perfectly unobjectionable sentence, he says, is
equivalent according to Smart's toke-reflexive analysis
to the self-contradictory
(14* ) The end of all utterance is earlier than
some utterance later than this one
Another un-detensable expression, according to
19
Prior
,
11 is the exclamation
J"LSee [P9], [PIO].
(15) Thank goodness that's over'.
Prior explains
...Not only is this [sentence ( 15 ) ].. .quite
clear without any date appended, but it says
something which is impossible that any use of
a tenseless copula with a date should convey.
It certainly doesn't mean the same as, e.g.,
'Thank goodness the date of the conclusion
of that thing is Friday, June 15
,
1954 ', even
if it be said then. (Nor, for that matter,
does it mean 'Thank goodness the conclusion
of that thing is contemporaneous with this
utterance ' . Why should anyone thank goodness
for that?) ( [P9]
,
p. 17 )
While these are interesting issues, they will be
at best touched on only briefly in this thesis. Progress
in solving some of these standard puzzles has been re-
tarded by the absence of a clear distinction between
tensed and tenseless sentences. In fact it will turn
out that what some philosophers have taken to be obvious
examples of tenseless sentences should instead be re-
garded as tensed. I shall devote the remainder of
this thesis, then, to finding an adequate distinction
between tensed and tenseless sentences.
Requirements for a Theory of Tensed Sentences
We should, by this time, have a rough idea of what
philosophers regard as tensed sentences. Let me list,
20
then, a. few intuitions about tensed, sentences, which
not only seem quite plausible, but which we should
reasonably expect a satisfactory account of tensed
sentences to be compatible with.
1) Any sentence is either tensed or tenseless.
It seems reasonable to suppose that tensed and tenseless
sentences divide the language (or at least the class of
declarative sentences, which, strictly speaking, is
all we are concerned with for the moment) without residue.
Unlike the linguist and grammarian, the philosopher
identifies a tensed sentence on the basis of some
semantical feature or set of features, and, presumably,
either a sentence has this feature (or set of features)
and is tensed, or it does not have this feature (or set
of features) and is tenseless. Naturally, there are
likely to be a variety of styles of tensed and tenseless
sentences. We have already seen that philosophers
admit to a diversity of sentence-forms within the class
of tenseless sentences. Not only are such sentences
as
(1) Red is a color
(2) All bachelors are unmarried
supposed to be tenseless, but so are sentences from
mathematics as well as the 'translations' of tensed
sentences formed according to one of the patterns of
21
analysis described above. Such a diversity, therefore,
is evidently not regarded as repugnant.
Writers on the subject of tensed and tenseless
sentences have not usually considered whether the two
classes of sentences exhaust the class of sentences.
This is not surprising, since for the most part, dis-
cussions of tensed and tenseless discourse have been woe-
fully cursory, especially given the importance attached
to some of the claims based on the distinction as it
has been made. Nevertheless it seems prudent to suppose
that an adequate analysis of the tensed/tenseless
distinction is one according to which a sentence is
either tensed or tenseless.
2) Tensed sentences exhibit some kind of semantical
relativity or instability. As far as I can see
,
every
writer on the subject agrees that tensed sentences,
unlike tenseless sentences, are semantically variable
in some way, although, as I have already suggested* the
source and nature of this variability has been explained
in a variety of ways. For some, replicas of a tensed
sentence are said to be able to take different truth-
values; for others, the extensions of predicates of
tensed sentences change from sentence-replica to
sentence-replica; and for others, no two replicas of
a tensed sentence, produced at different times, have
22
"bh.e same sense • And "these
,
as we shall see
,
are not the
only accounts.
It would be expected, then, that an adeauate
account of tensed sentences would explain how replicas
of tensed sentences differ semantically from each other,
and that such an account could explain both the (at
least) apparent truth-value instability of tensed
sentences, and the problems concerning agreement and
disagreement sketched briefly in the previous section.
3) Sentences in grammatically perfect tenses are
(semantically) tensed. Perfect tenses are, for example,
the future perfect ('John will have cpd'), the past per-
fect ('John had cpd'), and extended perfect tenses, like
'John will have been cping' . While we are not likely
ever to construe sentences with such complex tenses as
tenseless, confusions do arise over simple tenses. There
are, for instance, certain uses of the grammatical future-
tense which may be tenseless (e.g., 'Add 2 and 2 and you
will get 4'), and Russell has used grammatically past-
^See [R7J, and the passage quoted from [R7] on p. 12.
tense verbs tenselessly. More often still, the gramma-
tical present-tense is used for tenseless verbs. Phi-
losophers usually call this tense the 'tenseless present'.
4) Some analytic sentences are tensed. Given only
our rough grasp so far of tensed sentences, it seems
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plausible to suppose that there is a distinction
between
(2) All bachelors are unmarried
and
(16) Nobody will be (is now, has been) a
married bachelor
similar to that between
(17) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with,
earlier than) & John [is] fat at t)
and
(18) John will be (is now, has been) fat
The relevant feature shared by the two pairs of sentences
seems to be that the first sentence in each pair is
tenseless, while the second sentence is tensed. (16)
seems to stand to (2), in other words, as (18) stands
to (17).
With these four intuitions in mind, we are finally
in a position to examine in greater detail the most
prominent analyses of tensed and tenseless sentences.
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CHAPTER II
FREE REPEATABILITY
Introduction
It would appear that some philosophers have been
so impressed by the (perhaps only apparent) truth-value
instability of some tensed sentences, that they have
failed to probe very much further into the matter. We
have seen that some replicas of a sentence like
(19) John was fat
can be true, if produced after John is fat, while other
replicas can be false, if produced earlier than either
John's birth or the onset of John's girth. Such sen-
15tences are said by some philosophers ^ to be context-
15See Gale: [G2], [G3], [G4], [G5], Goodman: [G13],
Massey: [M6], Rosenberg: [R6], Smart: [S10], Thalberg:
[T2]
.
dependent, while other sentences—tenseless sentences
—
are said to be freely repeatable . Thus, regardless of
when we utter such sentences as
(1) Red is a color
(9) E^ [is] earlier than (later than, simultaneous
with) E£
(20) (Et)(t [is] earlier than (later than, si-
multaneous with) & John [ops] at t)
their truth-value (or sense, as some philosophers argue)
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is constant. If such sentences are true (or false) or
have a certain sense at one time, they will true (or false)
or have that sense whenever they happen to be produced.
[A tenseless sentence] is freely repeatable
in a way in which a tensed sentence is not,
i.e.,.the truth-value of the statements formed
from its use at any time is invariant. (rG41.
p. 104)
An objectionable feature of [tensed sentences]
is that they are context dependent: their truth
values depend on the times of their utterance.
([S10], p. 255)
Of some historical interest is the following passage
from a 1906 review of Hugh MacColl by Russell, 14 in
T4x Mind
, 1906, pp. 256-57.
which Russell observes not only the context-dependency
of tensed sentences, but also the need for a revisionary
tenseless language.
Ordinary language employs, for the sake of
convenience, many words whose meaning varies
with the context or with the time when they
are employed; thus statements using such words
must be supplemented by further data before
they become unambiguous ... .When we are told
'Mrs. Brown is not at home', we know the time
at which this is said, and therefore we know
what is meant. But in order to express
explicitly the whole of what is meant, it is
necessary to add the date, and then the state-
ment is no longer 'variable' but always true
or always false.... It is essential that logic
should employ only forms of words which are
unambiguous, and when this is done 'variable'
statements disappear.
Let us call the view that tensed and tenseless
sentences may be distinguished in this way the 'free
26
repeatability thesis'. This view has taken several
interesting forms, each of which warrants investigation.
Before commencing with this project, however, it should
illuminating to examine what is perhaps the principal
impetus for at least one
—
glaringly defective—version
of the free repatability thesis. We may call this
* McTaggart ' s Curse '
.
McTaggart's Curse
ISMcTaggart y thought that a distinction could be
-^See [Ml].
drawn between sentences making A-determinations
,
and
sentences expressing B-relations . In the former
16These are Gale's handy terms. McTaggart actually writes
only of positions on, or sentences expressing positions on,
the A or B-series.
class of sentences, something—an event, for McTaggart
—
is said to be past, present, or future. In the latter
class of sentences, events are ordered according to the
relations earlier than, later than, or simultaneous with .
A-sentences-—as members of the first class may be called
—
were thought to -'be context-dependent. An event can truly
be said to be past only after it has occurred, present
only while it is occurring, and future only before it
occurs. If, for example, we say of a past event that
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it is present (or future), the A-sentence we utter will
te false • But that A—sentence would, be true if we
uttered it while the event in question was present (or
future). A B-sentence, on the other hand, once true
(or false) will always be true (or false). If E is
earlier than E'
,
we can assert their ordering no matter
what our temporal position is with respect to those
17
events . '
Y7
r There are some problems (largely epistemological) about
asserting B-relations between events at least one of which
has not yet occurred. But we may ignore these given the
scope of this discussion.
McTaggart did not address himself to problems
concerning tensed and tenseless sentences. Some modern
18
authors, however, have been convinced that the class
yg
For example, Gale, Rosenberg, Thalberg, on. cit .
of tensed sentences is identical with the class of
A-sentences, and that the class of tenseless sentences
is identical with the class of B-sentences, and, pre-
sumably, that these classes are disjoint. Gale and
Rosenberg, for example, offer the following definitions.
A tenseless statement makes a temporal
designation by describing a B-relation be-
tween two events.... A tensed statement re-
fers to the A-de termination of an event.
( [G2] , pp. 53-54)
[Tensed sentences] make what, following
McTaggart, we shall call A-determinations—
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determinations of the pastness, presentness,
or futurity of some event.... [A tenseless
sentence], while conveying some temporal
information.
. .is neutral with respect to the
A-determinations of the two events
,
which it
mentions. It makes, rather, what we shall
call a B-determination
, locating two events
in the time series by means of the relational
qualities simultaneity
, being earlier than,
and being later than
.
([R6j, pTT^BT)
This view is difficult to sustain, for a number
>
of reasons.
First of all, McTaggart’s A and B-sentences take
only event-expressions as arguments. But both tensed
and tenseless sentences
—
given even our only rough
understanding of them—do not. For example, consider
the tensed
(10) The glass was full
(6) Mary is frowning
(21) John will be fat
and the tenseless
(22) John [is] fat on [date]
(13) The glass [is] full on (or at) [date]
none of whose singular terms are event-expressions.
Thus, if we are to take this extension of McTaggart's
view seriously, we should expect some account of how
the classes of A and B-sentences include sentences that
do not have event-expressions as arguments. No such
19
account has been offered by these authors. Sellars
19See [S3].
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presents the most complete extant analysis of the
relationships between A and B-sentences and tensed and
tenseless sentences. But he denies that the classes
can paired-off and identified in the way just mentioned.
What is needed from these other authors is clear
enough, however. With respect just to tensed sentences,
they must explain how sentences of the forms
(23) S's cping ( or S's being cp) is present
(24) S's cping (or S's being cp) is past
(23) S's cping (or S's being cp) is future
may be re-expressed as the tensed sentences
(23') S is cping (or is cp)
(24') S was cping (or S cpd) (or was cp)
(25') S will be cping (or S will cp) (or will
be cp)
What is needed, in other words, is an account of how
event-sentences can be re-expressed as thing-sentences
,
and conversely, how thing-sentences are re-expressable
as event-sentences. There may be no insuperable diffi-
culties with this enterprise, but some sort of sophis-
ticated theory of events would seem to be required to
explain what events and kind of events are denoted in
the following (apparently tensed) sentences.
(26) John was old [where does this event begin?]
(27) John hiccupped for the 10th time [what
kind of events recur?]
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(28) John was a male [is this an event at all?]
(29) John used to enjoy hiking [is this an
event at all?]
What are perhaps more serious problems for the
view under consideration concern B-sentences and tense-
less sentences. First of all, it seems that some tense-
less sentences simply have no event-language analogues.
Consider
(1) Red is a color
(2) All bachelors are unmarried
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4
none of which makes a B-determination. No events at all
are denoted in these sentences, much less two events
ordered according to the earlier-later relation.
Secondly, although
(30) S's cping [is] earlier than S's (J>ing
might be re-expressed as
(30*) (Et)(Et')(S [cps] at t & S [<ps] at t'
& t [is] earlier than t')
it is not clear what would be done about B-sentences
which appear to be tensed, for example,
(31) S’s cping was earlier than S’s (ping
Sentences like (31) sire ordinary enough, as in
(32) The breaking of the chandelier occurred
after the meal
(said while recounting the events of the previous night's
wild party). Moreover many more examples can be found
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simply by "translating certain thing—sentences into event-
language analogues, a practise which proponents of the
view under consideration would have to condone. For
example
(33) John will leave home after Mary returns
with the car
would become
(33') John's leaving home will be later than
Mary's returning with the car
These examples suggest that the class of B-sentences
cannot be identified with the class of tenseless sentences.
Even if put (31), for example, into the tenseless form
(31*) (Et)(Et')(S [cps] at t & S [c|>s] at t'
& t [is] earlier than t' &, both t and t'
[axe] earlier than )
we are left with the problem that a sentence such as (31)
is both a B-sentence
,
in virtue of ordering events
according to the earlier-later relation, and apparently
tensed. After all, (31) is true only at some times.
If I utter (31) before S cps and <J>s, the sentence is
false
.
Another problem with the view that the classes
of tensed and tenseless sentences are identical, re-
spectively, with the disjoint classes of A and B-sentences,
is the following. McTaggart's A and B-sentences express
temporal relations only when the topology of time is
taken to be that of an open single line. Tensed and
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tenseless sentences, however, can express a variety of
temporal topological relations.
McTaggart believed that—if time were real—it
would be represented topologically as follows,
where the arrow indicates the 'direction* of the future.
He did not think that the topology of time would be
represented in any of the following ways.
>
b
* >
a.
(iii)
(iv) 1
CL
(v)
Such representations as the above have been proposed by
philosophers interested in problems concerning, for
CL
b
(ii)
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example, future contingency, foreknowledge, and modal
and many-valued logics.^ How we represent time topo-
20 ~See, for example, Prior's discussion of topology in [P2]
en(^inS time in [P31. See also Grunbaum:
LGlpJ, LG16J, and van Fraassen: [VI].
logically depends, for example, on whether we take the
time series (if there is just one) to be dense, discrete,
linear, or whether we hold that there are possible futures
but no possible pasts, or both possible futures and
possible pasts, or neither possible futures nor possible
pasts.
A few examples should suffice to show how some
tensed or tenseless sentences are inexpressable in
McTaggart ' s A or B-language. The branching lines in
(iv) and (v) represent possible futures for (v) and
possible futures or pasts, depending on one's temporal
location, in (iv). In (ii) and (iii) we are to imagine
two independent time series. And in (iii), the di-
rection of the future for one series is the direction
of the past for the other. The theory of relativity
provides us with still further kinds of pictures. But
the above selection will suffice. The letters on the
lines are to be taken as standing for events, real
and possible.
However we might choose to describe the relations
between points b and c_ in (iv) and b, £, and d. in (v),
it is clear that it will not be accomplished by an A
or B-sentence
,
since none of the relevant events is
past, present, future, or earlier than, later than, or
simultaneous with the other(s). Thus, although we
might have ways of describing the relations between
these events, McTaggart would not. It seems reasonable
to suppose, moreover, that however we would talk
about these events, our assertions would either be
21tensed or tenseless.
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Cf., the first intuition concerning tensed sentences
in Chapter I, pp. 20-21.
McTaggart' s A and B-sentences also cannot adequately
express relations between events when time is taken as
topologically closed (e.g., circular). This option
allows that world history might be finite but unbounded,
and must be taken seriously by philosophers and physicists
who admit numbers other than real numbers as values for
22
the time variable in physical equations. For McTaggart,
22See [Ml], p. 9.
and for a topologically open and linear time generally,
the earlier-later relation is asymmetrical. But in
closed time this relation is symmetrical; for any two
points, a and b, on a circle, if a is before b, then
b is also before a. Thus, although we can express
35
relations between events in closed time, and although
we would presumably do so with tensed or tenseless
sentences, in most of the interesting cases we could
not use an A or B-sentence
•
Consider the following diagram.
NOW
As before, the arrow indicates the ’direction 1 of the
future. Suppose, then, that John cps at t and Mary <|)s
at t ’ • From our temporal position at the point marked
’now’, the following conjunctions are true.
(34) John's cping at t [is] earlier than Mary's
<J>ing at t' & Mary's 4>ing at t' [is]
earlier than John's cping at t_
(35) John's cping at t was earlier than Mary's
(J)ing at t' & Mary's 4>ing at t' is
earlier than John's cping at t & John's
cping at t will be earlier than Mary's
<|)ing at t'
Although the earlier-later relation is used in (34) and
(33), it is not McTaggart's earlier-later relation, and
hence (34) and (35) are not B-sentences. If these were
McTaggart B—sentences, then the earlier—later relation
would be asymmetrical and the sentences would be false.
Moreover (35) would probably be unintelligible as a
B-sentence
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Furthermore, from our position at now
, if we say
(truly)
(36) Relative to now, John's (ping at t is
past and John's cping at t_ is future
we are not using a McTaggart A-sentence, since although
McTaggart (in trying to establish the unreality of time)
claimed that an event E could be past, present and future,
he did not mean that E could have more than one of these
if
determinations relative to the same time. 2^ Thus (36),
25See [Ml], p. 21.
which can be true in closed time
,
and which is true given
the ordering of events pictured above
,
is not an A-sentence
,
since if it were, it would have to be false.
It appears, then, that as far as talk about temporal
facts is concerned, the view that the classes of tensed
and tenseless sentences are identical, respectively,
with the disjoint classes of A and B-sentences is false.
Gale and Rosenberg are clearly concerned with talk’
about temporal facts. But it should be obvious that
if they want to offer an account of the distinction
between tensed and tenseless sentences, they must be
prepared to analyze the tenseless
(1) Red is a color
(2) All bachelors are unmarried
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4
none of which expresses a B-relation. It thus appears
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that Gale and Rosenberg either made a grave error in
failing to account for such sentences, or that they
were only offering an account of the difference between
tensed sentences and a sub-class of the class of tense-
less sentences-namely, those that make temporal deter-
minations. But as we have seen, even this more modest
undertaking was unsuccessful.
Let us return, then, to a consideration of the claim
that tensed sentences alone are not freely repeatable.
Even if we cannot identify tensed sentences with A-
sentences, is this claim satisfactory?
Problems with Free Repeatability
a. The two major formulations of the
free repeatability thesis
We have considered the sense in which A-sentences
are supposed to be context-dependent
—namely, that if
an event is, say, past, then a true A-sentence asserting
its pastness can be produced only after the event has
occurred. The situation is thought to be pretty much
the same with tensed sentences generally. The sentence
(19) John was fat
can be true only at a time after a time at which John
is fat. If John had never been fat, (19) would be
false
.
This view warrants further scrutiny. It has been
38
supported by philosophers of varying persuasions (e.g.,
Gale, Goodman, Smart), not all of whom have identified
the class of A-sentences with the class of tensed sentences
Two major versions of the free repeatability thesis
may be distinguished
—namely, those championed by Good-
man and Gale. It is probably worth mentioning, inciden-
tally
,
that both these philosophers regard statements
and not sentences as being tensed and tenseless. But
since what I call sentences do take truth-values and
have sense, I do not think that any violence is done
to their views—for these purposes at least—by the
formulations of them which follow.
Gale's view has been expressed in a variety of ways,
and adjusted to meet certain criticisms lodged by Rosen-
24berg. Nevertheless, his position can be summed up
^In [R6] •
fairly as follows. Converting his talk about statements
to talk about sentences, we can say that for Gale, a
sentence is not freely repeatable (i.e., is a tensed
sentence) if and only if its replicas can have truth-
values different from that of the original.
...A tensed statement makes a temporal
determination through the use of a sentence
which can be used only at a certain time(s)
so as to make a true statement. CLG4], p. 104)
It would seem to follow, then, that a sentence is
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freely repeatable if and only if it is necessary that
every replica of the sentence has the same truth-value
as that sentence. Thus
(19) John was fat
may be true now, given John's girth. But it could be
false. That is, it would be false if asserted before
John put on his present weight.
Goodman takes quite a different approach. He
V
claims that a sentence is freely repeatable if and only
if every replica of the sentence translates (or advances
the same claim as) that sentence.
. . .A tensed statement has as constant a
truth value as a tenseless one; and a tense-
less statement, no less than a tensed one,
is an event in time . The difference is that
tensed statements and other statements with
indicators are not, so to speak, 'freely
repeatable ' . . . .A term or statement is said
to be freely repeatable in a given discourse
if all its replicas therein are also trans-
lations of it. ([G13], p. 368)
A replica of the sentence
(19) John was fat
would not be a translation of the original occurrence
of the sentence. A particular occurrence of (19) would
be more fully rendered as
(19') John [is] fat earlier than t
where t is the time of utterance of that occurrence of
(19) • And another instance of (19) would have the
sense of
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(19") John [is] fat earlier than t*
where
_t is the time of utterance of the new replica.
Thus, for Goodman, tensed sentences do not change
truth-value. Every replica of (19)—that is, that
particular string of symbols or phonemes—is a different
sentence, since the sense of each replica of (19) is
relativized to a different time. However, every replica
of
(37) John [runs] on Nov. 5, 1971
translates every other replica. Thus (37) is tenseless.
To be fair, it is not clear that either Goodman
or Gale offers the free repeatability thesis as pro-
viding an analysis of the distinction between tensed
and tenseless sentences. Gale did offer some definitions
of tensed and tenseless sentences, and these were criti-
cized in the previous section. Non-repeatability, on
the other hand, is held by Gale to be a criterion for
2S
a sentence being tensed. y But Gale also says that
^See, for example, [G2], p. 5^ and [G4], p. 104.
non-repeatability is what all A-sentences have in
common. Consider the entire paragraph from which the
previous quotation from Gale was taken.
We must first distinguish a tensed statement
from one that makes a time determination in a
tenseless manner. There are, of course, count-
less grammatical techniques for tensing a
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statement
,
i.e
. ,
for indicating that the event
?flked ^out is past, present or future.What all of these different 'usages' have in
common, and what will serve as a* criterion forbeing a tensed statement is this: A tensed
statement makes a temporal determination
through the use of a sentence which can be
used only at_ a certain time (s
)
so as to make
a true statement. A tenseless statement
which makes a time determination is one which
describes a timeless relation of either
precedence or subsequence or simultaneity
between two events, without asserting that
either one is past, present or future; there-
fore
,
the sentence used in a tenseless state-
ment is freely repeatable in a way in which
a tensed statement is not, i_.e_.
,
the truth-
value of the
. statements formed from its use
at any time is invariant. ( [G4]
,
p. 104)
Elsewhere, Gale makes the same point as follows.
• • .A tensed statement refers to the A-
determination of an event. There are count-
less grammatical techniques for tensing a
statement of which tensed verbs are only one
,
but what they all have in common, and what
will serve as a criterion for calling something
a tensed statement, is this: a tensed state-
ment makes a temporal designation through the
utterance at some moment of time of a sentence
which cannot be used at every other moment of
time so as to make a true statement. The sen-
tence employed in a tensed statement is context-
bound, since it is not freely repeatable. The
reason for this is that a tensed statement
refers to the A-determination of an event, but
since this event changes in respect to its
A-determination the sentence employed in a
tensed statement cannot appropriately be used
at every moment of time. ([G2], p. 54)
Gale is clearly claiming in these passages that all the
various techniques for making A-determinations—that is,
the various varieties of tensed sentences—have non-
repeatability as a feature.
42
Thus it might be that Gale offers the free repeata-
bility thesis as another version of the account of tensed
sentences criticized in the previous section-namely
,
that the classes of tensed and tenseless sentences are
identical, respectively, with the disjoint classes of
A and B-sentences. But if Gale does regard the free
repeatability thesis as merely another version of this
already-criticized account of tensed sentences, he is
mistaken, since one can hold the free repeatability
thesis without identifying tensed sentences with A-
sentences and tenseless sentences with B-sentences.
Observe that, in the passage from [G4], Gale claims
;o b: stinguishmg two classes of sentences that
make time determinations. This is clearly a vestige
of the view criticized earlier, and Gale can do with-
out it. In fact he should do without it, since some
of the most transparently freely repeatable tenseless
sentences are those that, like
(1) Red is a color
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4
do not make B-determinations
.
Moreover, as we shall see, it would also be a mis-
take to regard Gale's version of the free repeatability
thesis as an independent and alternative account of the
distinction between tensed and tenseless sentences
(rather than just A and B-sentences). Not only is
4-3
non-repeatability not a necessary and sufficient condition
for a sentence being tensed, but as our examination of
Goodman will reveal, it may not even be a sufficient
condition.
Goodman's assessment of the free repeatability
thesis is also a matter for speculation. The closest
he comes to an explicit definition of 'tensed sentence'
(or 'tensed statement '
. for Goodman) is the following.
...The difference is that tensed statements
and other statements with indicators are not,
so to speak, 'freely repeatable'.
(The context of this passage appeared earlier on p. 39).
What is puzzling about this is that Goodman appears
to be telling us the difference between tensed and tense-
less sentences while admitting that there are other
sentences (besides tensed sentences) with indicators.
And, of course, the suggestion is that these other
sentences with indicators are not tensed. But then
free repeatability would not be the distinguishing
feature of tenseless sentences. It is thus not clear
whether Goodman is offering an account of the distinction
between tensed and tenseless sentences, or whether he
is merely claiming that tensed sentences belong to
the class of indexical sentences. If the latter, then
Goodman appears not to have offered an account of what
is special about that particular sub-class of the class
I
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of indexical sentences. If the former, then Goodman has
offered an inadequate account of the tensed/tenseless
distinction, for the very reason that there are tense-
less sentences containing indexicals.
In spite of these difficulties in determining
the importance attached to the free repeatability thesis,
the thesis is not totally implausible
,
and should be
examined whether or not Gale, Goodman, or anyone else
regards it as a satisfactory account of the distinction
between tensed and tenseless sentences. Since apparent
truth-value instability and apparent change of sense
are two of the most prominent features of many tensed
sentences, some form of the free repeatability thesis
is likely to be entertained by any novice trying to
decide what a tensed sentence is. It should therefore
be illuminating to see why the free repeatability
thesis is inadequate as an account of the distinction
between tensed and tenseless sentences.
For ease of exposition, then, let us henceforth
assume that Gale and Goodman are offering full-fledged
accounts of the distinction between tensed and tenseless
sentences. This is not an outrageous assumption in
Gale's case, and is a real toss-up in Goodman's.
One last point should be made before beginning
the examination of the two major formulations of the
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free repeatability thesis. Certain remarks made by
Quine suggest that he might hold a Gale-type version
of the thesis. In [Q33, for example, he notes that cer-
tain sentences like 'You owe me ten dollars' may be true
at some times and false at others, depending on the cir-
cumstances of their production, and contrasts such
sentences with
...eternal sentences: sentences that stay
forever true, or forever false, independently
of any special circumstances under which they
happen to be uttered or written. Under the
head of eternal sentences one thinks first
of the sentences of arithmetic, since time
and place are so conspicuously irrelevant to
the subject matter of arithmetic. One thinks
next of the lav/s of physics; for these, though
occupied with the material world in a way that
the laws of pure physics are nob, are meant
to hold for all times and places. The general
run of eternal sentences, however, are not
so august as their name and these examples
suggest. Any casual statement of inconse-
quential fact can be filled out into an eter-
nal sentence by supplying names and dates
and cancelling the tenses of verbs. Corre-
sponding to 'It is raining' and 'You owe me
ten dollars' we have the eternal sentence 'It
rains in Boston, Mass., on July 15, 1968' and
'Bernard J. Ortcutt owes W. V. Quine ten dollars
on July 15? 1968', where 'rains' and 'owes'
are to be thought of now as tenseless. ([Q3],
p. 13)
Although Quine uses the term 'eternal', it is not
obvious that he means by 'eternal' something other than
26
'tenseless'. In [Q2], however, we are told that,
26
PP. 193-194-
.
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while all eternal sentences are tenseless, not all
tenseless sentences are eternal. To de-tense a sen-
tence
,
according to Quine
,
one has only to de-tense
the verbs in the sentence and add appropriate temporal
modifiers, like 'now', 'then', and 'at t*. 27 But to
Cf., the quotation from [Q2] on p. 12, and see [Q2],
pp. 170-173, 193-194. * ’
eternalize a sentence, it is necessary to fill in all
the information implicitly provided in the sentence or
in the context of utterance. This Job involves, among
other things, replacing the temporal modifiers with
detailed dates. And since tenseless non-eternal sen-
tences tend to contain such temporal indicator words
as 'now' and 'then', we may suppose that Quine, like
Goodman, does not regard all tenseless sentences as
having invariant truth-values.
b • Gale ' s view
One initial problem with Gale's account is that
he never fully explains what a 'temporal determination'
is. Presumably a sentence can make such a determination
even though it does not overtly contain a reference to
a time, since ordinary sentences like
(19) John was fat
are supposed to make temporal determinations.
It is also not clear whether Gale really intended
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to state his position as a modal thesis; nor is it clear
that he saw the consequences of doing otherwise. Con-
sider again part of the passage from [G4], quoted earlier,
in which Gale discusses free repeatability.
. . .A tensed statement makes a temporal
determination through the use of a sentence
which can be used only at a certain time(s)
so as to make a true statement. A tense-
less statement which makes a time determi-
nation is one which describes a timeless
relation of either precedence or subsequence
or simultaneity between two events, without
asserting that either one is past, present
or future; therefore, the sentence used in
a tenseless statement is freely repeatable
in a way in which a tensed sentence is not,
i.e
.
,
the truth-value of the statements
formed from its use at any time is invariant.
One would have expected Gale to say that a freely re-
peatable sentence is such that the truth-value of the
statements formed from its use at any time must be in-
variant, since a non-freely repeatable sentence was said
to be a sentence which can make statements of different
po
truth-values
.
pg
''
In the beginning of the paragraph from [G2]
,
part of
which was reproduced above (p. 41), Gale similarly pre-
sents a non-modal definition of a freely repeatable
sentence and a modal definition of a non-repeatable
sentence
.
Let us assume that this discrepancy is only an
oversight. Gale, would not, in any case, have wanted
to say that a freely repeatable sentence is one whose
replicas have (rather than must have) the same truth-
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value
,
since
(38) The sun will rise tomorrow
( 39 ) Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo
would have then been tenseless. This, surely, is
counter-intuitive. Gale's view requires more than de
facto repeatability.
Moreover, Gale's remarks on free repeatability in-
vite another interpretation of his position. On this
reading Gale still advances a modal thesis, but (38)
and (39) count as tenseless anyway. I have been under-
standing Gale as claiming that a sentence S is tensed
(non-repeatable) if and only if its replicas can have
different truth-values from that of the original. But
we might take him to mean that S is tensed if and only
if it is not possible that all replicas of S have the
same truth-value. The key phrases from Gale are as
follows
.
...[A tensed sentence] can be used only at
a certain time(s) so as to make a true state-
ment]! CtG4j, p. 104)
...[A tensed sentence] cannot be used at
every other moment of time so as to make a
true statement. ([G2], p. 5*0
And let us ignore a later remark in the same paragraph
of [G2]—namely,
...[A tensed sentence] cannot appropriately
(my italics) be used at every moment of time.
since, presumably, appropriateness of utterance depends
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on matters in addition to the tense of sentences. Even
the paradigm tenseless sentence
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4
cannot be used appropriately at every moment of time.
In any case, on this new reading of Gale, a sentence
S would be tenseless if and only if it is possible that
all replicas of S have the same truth-value. But then (38)
and ( 39 ) are tenseless.
Since this second modal formulation of Gale's view
is more obviously unacceptable than the first, let us
consider the first modal formulation to be what Gale was
driving at. V/e may therefore take Gale's view to be the
following.
Sentence S is tensed if and only if it is
possible that there are two different times
such that S is true at one time and false
at the other.
Sentence S is tenseless if and only if it
is necessary that there are no two different
times such that S is true at one time and
false at the other.
Although this seems to be the most plausible way
of stating Gale's version of the free repeatability thesis,
it also has difficulties. The first of these is that
conjunctions of tensed with tenseless sentences will be
tensed, while some hybrid disjunctions will be tense-
less. That is,
(40) John was a bachelor & bachelors [are]
unmarried
50
will be tensed, sincG it will be false prior to John's
birth, and true after his death. But
(41) Jonn was a bachelor or bachelors Care]
unmarried
will be tenseless, since the second disjunct, and hence
the whole sentence, must be true whenever it is produced.
Hybrid disjunctions with false tenseless components, of
course, will be tensed, since the truth-value of the
whole disjunction will hinge on the truth-value of the
tensed component. Thus the truth-value of
(42) John as a bachelor or bachelors [are]
married
is false only when the first disjunct is false. And
lastly, while hybrid conjunctions with true tenseless
conjuncts—like (40)—are tensed, hybrid conjunctions
with false tenseless components are always false and
hence tenseless. Thus every replica of
(43) John was a bachelor & bachelors [are]
married
takes the value false, regardless of the truth-value of
the first conjunct.
Misgivings about this situation would probably be
due to a belief that, however we decide to classify com-
pound sentences with tensed and tenseless components,
we should not do so on the basis of the kind of connec-
tive in the sentences. That is, (40)-(43) may be called
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all tensed, or all tenseless, but they should fall within
the same catesory. This is not a decisive objection to
Gale's version of the free repeatability thesis. But
it is a peculiarity we might want to avoid.
Furthermore we provisionally decided in Chapter I
that a sentence is either tensed or tenseless. Thus,
if we wish to avoid the above results, it would not help
to rule hybrids as neither tensed nor tenseless. I should
think it would be preferable to abandon this form of the
free repeatability thesis rather than make this counter-
intuitive move.
We might, I suppose, decide that only simple sen-
tences must be either tensed or tcnseless. But it is
by no means imperative that we make this concession.
Unlike the superficially similar and troublesome dicho-
tomies between normative and factual sentences and ob-
servation and theoretical sentences, difficulties with
classifying tensed/tenseless hybrids are not inevitable.
On all three of the remaining accounts to be examined,
these hybrids come out quite plausibly as tensed. Thus
we need not resign ourselves to encountering difficulties
in classifying hybrids, and perhaps excepting them from
the classification.
There are more serious problems with Gale's view,
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however. Consider the following sentences.
(44) John was a married bachelor
(45) Nobody has squared the circle
(46) I do not exist
(47) John will have slept 8 hours before his
job interview
Each of these sentences counts as tenseless for Gale,
since replicas of these sentences must have the same
truth-value as that of the original. (44) and (45) are
apparently necessarily false and true, respectively,
but they are also apparently tensed. We saw in Chapter I
that it seemed implausible to rule out some analytic
sentences as tensed, and that
(16) Nobody will be (is now, has been) a
married bachelor
stands to
(2) All bachelors are unmarried
as
(18) John will be (is now, has been) fat
stands to
(17) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with,
earlier than) & John [is] fat at t)
Granted, sentences such as (44) and (45) are a bit unusual,
but that should in no way count against their being tensed.
29
Rosenberg, J interestingly, observed that sentences
29In [R6]
,
p. 148.
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which are necessarily true do not appear to make A-deter-
mmations
,
and for this reason he ruled that they are
not tensed. But it seems that (44) and (45) make A-deter-
minations as much as do other tensed sentences having thing-
expressions as arguments. (44) and (45) would have as
event-language analogues
(W) John's being a married bachelor is past
(4-5 ) Nobody's squaring the circle is past
just as
(48) John flunked the exam
has an analogue in
(48') John's flunking the exam is past
And of course even if (44) and (45) did not make A-deter-
mmations
,
we have seen that this is not sufficient
grounds for ruling that they are not tensed.
The pragmatically paradoxical (46) is more than a
bit unusual. But, again, that is no reason for refusing
to consider it, especially since we would not hesitate
to count
(49) I did not exist
(50) I will not exist
as tensed.
(47) is considerably less extraordinary than (44)-
(46). But it, too, turns out to be tenseless on Gale's
view. Clearly, if (47) is true (or false) at one time,
it must be true (or false) at all times, even though the
temporal location of the event of John's sleeping with
respect to the time of utterance of (4-7) changes with
each successive replication. There cannot be one time at
wfo-d-Cih it will be the case that it was the case that John
sleeps 8 hours before his Job interview, and another time
at which it will be the case that it was the case that
John does not sleep 8 hours before his Job interview.
Against this, someone might argue that sentences
in the grammatical future perfect are rather strange,
pragmatically. A sentence like (4-7) cannot be uttered
appropriately on as many occasions as a sentence in a
simple tense, like 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'. For
this reason (so the argument would proceed), it seems
pointless to talk about the truth-values of replicas of
sentences in the future perfect tense, since the contexts
in which such sentences can be uttered coherently are so
specialized that most of their replications are likely
to be nonsensical. Although 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon',
if uttered indiscriminately, might occur as a non senuitur
in most contexts, it can nevertheless be understood out
of context. (4-7), on the other hand, cannot even be
understood unless it is uttered before John's interview
and is preceded by a remark like 'I hope John will be well
rested for his Job interview'
•
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But all tensed sentences, it seems to me, are in
the same boat pragmatically
,
though of course not to the
same degree. For example,
(51) John's analysis of the situation was
correct
makes no sense in a contekt in which we do not know what
John's analysis is. Moreover, 'Caesar crossed the Rubi-
con' would be totally inappropriate—if not nonsensical—
when uttered prior to Caesar's birth. But it is just
this kind of case that Gale's version of the free repeata-
bility thesis is supposed to cover. At a time prior to
Caesar's birth, 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is false,
regardless of how appropriate an utterance it would have
been then. Similarly, although it may be quite awkward
to utter sentences in the future perfect in most contexts,
what matters for the free repeatability thesis is the
truth-value of the sentence in those contexts. It should
not be any easier to understand and determine the truth-
value of a past-tense sentence about an as yet non-existent
individual—for example,
(52) Nixon's great-grandson was an atheist
than an out-of-context sentence in the future perfect.
It would seem to be a grave defect in Gale's version
of the free repeatability thesis, then, that some sen-
tences in the future perfect tense would count as tense-
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less. But not all perfect-tensed, sentences fail Gale’s
criterion. For example,
(55) John will have slept 8 hours by the time
I get to Phoenix
can perhaps be true only at a time prior to my arrival
in Phoenix, since, if the word 'get' in the adverbial
clause can be used only before my arrival, the sentence
will be false after that time. Furthermore, sentences
in the past perfect can change truth-value . 'John had
cpd' cannot be true before John cps
,
though it will be true
afterwards
.
Another kind of sentence which appears tensed yet
which fails Gale's criterion we may call 'omnitemporal'.
An omnitemporal sentence is a disjunction consisting of
three tensed disjuncts, which differ only in that one is
in the present-tense, one is in the past-tense, and one
is in the future-tense. Such a sentence might therefore
have the form
(54) S cpd or S is cping or S will (p
Alternatively, we might abbreviate this by prefixing the
present-tense component with the disjunctive tensed
operator, 'it is, was, or will be the case that...'.
Clearly, if an omnitemporal sentence S is true (or false)
at one time, it is true (or false) at all times. What
suggests that at least some omnitemporal sentences are
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tensed, however, in addition to all the components of
such sentences being tensed, is that these sentences
exhibit a kind of semantical variability characteristic
of tensed sentences and rather unlike that of what we have
taken so far as paradigm tenseless sentences. Although
omnitemporal sentences have stable truth-values
,
some
omnitemporal sentences are true at different times in
virtue of the truth of different components. Thus, prior
to S's first (ping, (54) is true because the future-tense
component is true. But after S's last (ping, ( 54 ) i s true
because the past-tense component is true. Thus, while
the truth-value of an omnitemporal sentence never changes,
any omnitemporal sentence which does not report an eternal
event or a perpetually recurring event is such that the
truth-values of its components change with time.
Consider, on the other hand, a tenseless disjunc-
tion of the form
(55) [is] earlier than E^ or E
2 [is]
earlier than E-,
t>
If only the first disjunct (say) of (55) is true, (55)
will always be true in virtue of the truth of that com-
ponent. Not only do paradigm tenseless disjunctions have
constant truth-values, but, unlike some omnitemporal
sentences, the truth-values of their components do not
change with time.
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What may yet be another difficulty with Gale’s
position is that he seems to take his version of the
free repeatability thesis to be equivalent to the view
that tensed sentences differ from tenseless sentences
in virtue of the rules controlling their use.^°
5
°See [G4], [G5].
Following his presentation of the free repeatability
thesis in [G4] (quoted above, p. 40), Gale writes,
The difference, then, between a tensed and
tenseless statement is found in a difference
in the rules controlling the use of the sen-
tences employed in such statements. The...
'Rules for Tensed Assertion' state that the
present tensed sentence is used to describe
events virtually simultaneous with the descri-
bing of them ; ahe cast tensed sentence to' des-
cribe events earlier than the describing of
them ; and the future tensed sentence to des-
cribe events later than the describing of them.
TTgJTT, p. 1041
Perhaps this in itself is not an outlandish position. But
Gale's rules are inadequate for any tensed sentence not
in the simple past, present, or future-tense. For example,
Gale's rules do not cover cases in which the event des-
cribed (if any event is described at all) by a use of the
future perfect is prior to the time of utterance
,
as we
may suppose it to be when uttering
(^6) John will have fought with his wife
before he arrives here
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While this need not constitute an obvious defect in the
free repeatability thesis, it is symptomatic of the
tendency among philosophers to overlook the complexity
of tensed discourse.
^
31 "
Mayo, Prior, fteichenbach, and Sellars are conspicuous
exceptions
.
c. Goodman’s view
Goodman's discussion of free repeatability raises
still another nest of problems. To recap briefly, Good-
man characterizes a freely repeatable expression as
follows
.
...A term or statement is said to be freely
repeatable in a given discourse if all its
replicas therein are also translations of it.
(CG133, P. 368)
And with certain qualifications already noted^2
,
I have
^p. 44.
suggested that we regard Goodman as identifying the classes
of freely repeatable and non-repeatable sentences with the
classes of tenseless and tensed sentences, respectively.
At first glance, it would seem that Goodman, in
the above passage, is providing a sufficient condition
for a sentence being freely repeatable, since his asser-
tion has the form of a conditional. Strictly speaking,
moreover, Goodman says that if all the replicas of an
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expression are translations of it, then that expression
is said to be freely repeatable. But we are not inter-
ested here in the conditions under which a sentence is
said to be freely repeatable; we want to know under what
conditions a sentence is freely repeatable. I have been
assuming that Goodman is likewise not really interested
in public opinion concerning free repeatability, and
that he was obliquely offering a necessary and sufficient
condition for a sentence being freely repeatable (tense-
less)—namely,
Tl: S is freelv repeatable (tenseless) if and
only if (x;(x is a replica of S => x
translates 3)
I will continue to assume that this is Goodman’s posi-
tion, although as I explained earlier,^ even if it is
^p. 44.
not his view, it is of sufficient intrinsic interest to
warrant examination.
But Tl has a serious flaw—namely, that any sen-
tence which is never replicated counts as freely re-
peatable (tenseless). Assuming that the conditional to
the right of 'if and only if' is a material conditional,
that conditional will be satisfied when the antecedent
is false—that is, when S has no replicas. Thus any
tensed sentence would be freely repeatable as long as
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it is produced only once. Moreover, even if Goodman
were offering only a sufficient condition for a sentence
being freely repeatable—that is, even if his view was
T2: If (x)(x is a replica of S =3 x translates
S) then S is freely repeatable (tenseless)
the problem would remain.
It is strange, in any case, that Goodman would
undertake to explain free repeatability with a non-modal
thesis like Tl. Let us therefore revise T1 to read
T3: S is freely repeatable (tenseless) if
and only if it is necessary that (x)(x
is a replica of 3 => x translates S)
S is non-repeatable (tensed) if and only
if it is possible that (Ex)[x is a replica
of S & ~(x translates S)]
Does T3 provide a satisfactory account of the distinction
between tensed and tenseless sentences?
T3 at least avoids most of the difficulties troubling
Gale. Hybrids like (40)-(43) would be tensed, since at
least one component changes its sense each time the
sentence is replicated. Similarly, all of
(38) The sun will rise tomorrow
(39) Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo
(44) John was a married bachelor
(43) Nobody has squared the circle
(46) I do not exist
(47) John will have slept 8 hours before
his job interview
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as well as omnitemporal sentences would be tensed
,
since
the sense of the verbs changes with each time of replica-
tion. That is, every replica of, say, ( 38 ) will indicate
a different time of utterance
,
as long as the replicas
do not occur simultaneously.
But T3 takes sentences with non-temporal indicator
words as tensed, simply because it is not necessary that
replicas of those sentences all translate each other.
Consider
( 37 ) The barn [is] west of here
The verb, and indeed the whole sentence, is to be under-
stood as not having temporal import—that is
,
as not
ioself containing a reference to a time or having a trans-
lation containing a reference to a time. ’Here' is to
be given a Goodmanian interpretation, according to which
it names the region in which it lies.^4 Thus 'here* has
^See [Gly], pp. 363-564.
no covert temporal reference. Each replica of (57),
asserted from position P, translates every other replica
produced at P, regardless of the time of the replica's
production. Even if the barn has been on a trailer which
moved between replications of (57), any replica of (57)
asserted from P would be a translation of any other replica
asserted from P. The same claim would be made by those
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replicas as long as they are produced at P. Moreover,
each replica would have the same truth-value (although
Goodman is not concerned with this), since given Goodman's
understanding of tenseless verbs, (37) would be true at
P if and only if at some time prior to, simultaneous
with, or later than the utterance of (37), the barn is
west of position P.
Nevertheless, two replicas of (37), produced from
different positions, do not translate each other, re-
gardless of when they are produced. Thus (57) is not
freely repeatable, and would be tensed according to T3.
But (57) seems to be tenseless, granting, perhaps,
the plausibiliry of the notion of tensed verbs. All our
informal tests fail for this sentence. Since it cannot
be translated by an expression which contains a reference
to time, or to an utterance or some other event, (57)
does not stand to a tenseless translation formed according
to one of the tv/o patterns of analysis as
(18) John will be (is now, has been) fat
stands to
(17) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with,
earlier than) & John [is] fat at t)
Thus it would be tenseless according to the atemporality
criterion for tenselessness provided on p. 15 in Chapter I.
Nor does (57) stand to a contrasting sentence like
(58) The barn was (will be) west of here
as
(1C) The glass was full
stands to
(id The glass is full
(12) The glass will be full
What stands to (58) in that way is not (57), but rather
the present-tense
(59) The barn is west of here
To be fair, this latter informal test is not con-
clusive
,
since there are some tensed sentences which
seem to fail it. One such sentence is the (semantically)
future-tensed
(60) Next week I am speaking to the board of
trustees
which has a present-tense verb, and which would not be
distinguishable from its present-tense contrast on the
basis of the inflection of its verb.
(60) is an interesting kind of informal expression,
and warrants some examination. But it does not pose any
problems here. For one thing I suspect that we could
explain how such sentences contrast with other tensed
sentences and how tenseless sentences fail to contrast
with tensed sentences in this way. It is probably sig-
nificant, for example, that in the absence of the adver-
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bial clause ’next week' and additional contextual infor-
mation, we would not know that 'I am speaking to the
board of trustees' is in the future-tense, although we
would still know that it is tensed.
What is more important, though, is that (57) counts
as tenseless according to the criterion discussed in
Chapter I, that atemporal sentences are tenseless. One
reason this is so important is that philosophers holding
radically different views about the nature of tensed
sentences all seem to agree to this criterion of tense-
lessness. The reason tensed sentences are supposed to
be interesting in the first place is that they are all
temporally significant in seme way. Thus the apparent
failure of the second informal test above is of little
consequence. It should still be useful, though, as long
as we are not dealing with colloquialisms and other in-
formal uses of the language. And clearly the expressions
of a revisionary tenseless language are anything but
colloquial or informal.
Once we see, then, that (57) is a decent counter-
example to our modalized Goodmanian thesis, T3, further
such examples are easy to produce. Some might even have
temporal import or significance , such as
(61) The murder of John Doe on 1/9/75 [is]
spatially contiguous with here
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Since (61) is clearly not an expression of ordinary
English, the second of the two above informal tests
should apply. Like (57) , (61) does not stand to con-
trasting tensed sentences like
(62) The murder of John Doe on 1/9/73 will
be (was) spatially contiguous with here
as (10) stands to (11) and (12). What stands to (62)
in this way is the present-tense
(63) The murder of John Doe on 1/9/73 is
spatially contiguous with here
It is important to remember that although some
tensed sentences like (60) do not contrast in a certain
way with some other tensed sentences, (57) and (61) do
not contrast with any tensed sentences as (58) contrasts
with ( 59 ), or as (62) contrasts with (63). Since (57)
and (61) are obviously not complex-tensed sentences,
like the future perfect, they would be in the past,
present or future-tense if they were in any tense at all.
Moreover if ( 57 ) and (61) were in one of these tenses,
then they would contrast, respectively, with one of (58)
and (59) or (62) and (63), as these sentences contrast
with each other. But since ( 57 ) and (61) do not contrast
with any of these tensed sentences in this way, they are
not tensed.
I do not intend to specify here precisely how
tensed sentences like (58) and (59) contrast with each
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other, since I think it is sufficiently clear that they
j-Q contrast, and that their renderings—like ( 57)—
using tenseless verbs do not contrast with them in the
same way.
The significance of counter-examples like (61) is
that we cannot patch-up T3 simply by stipulating that
the sentences being tested for free repeatability are
in some way temporally informative. Thus (61) counts
equally against Gale, since it presumably makes a 'tem-
poral determination' (if any sentence does), and since
its replicas can have different truth-values—depending
on the location of the utterer. A person cannot be
at position F without being there at some time t. Hence
if there is a P at which (61) could be false, there is
also a time t at which it could be false.
Someone sympathetic to T3 but unsympathetic to
Goodman's treatment of indexicals might try to circum-
vent the above difficulties by offering an account of
indexicals according to which the sense of all such
expressions is relativized to the time of their pro-
duction. That is, the indexical 'here', for example,
would be regarded as referring not just to the area in
which it lies, nor would 'I' refer only to its producer.
Rather, indexicals would all refer—in addition—to the
time of their production. We can take this to mean that
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'here', for example, either means something like 'where
I am now' or 'here-at-t' where
'
t
' is the time of
utterance
.
On either of these readings, ( 57 ) and (61) would
be tensed, since replicas produced at different times
would have different senses, even if they were pro-
duced at the same location.
But it is interesting to observe that, even though
( 57 ) and (61) are tensed on these readings of 'here',
it is not clear what tense they are in. Reading ( 57 )
as
(57') The barn [is] west of where I am now
is more likely to be taken as a present-tense sentence
than
(57") The barn [is] west of here-at-t
since it is not very clear Just what ( 57 M ) means, and
since it also does not appear to contain a reference
to the present. But even (57') does not seem to be in the
present-tense. Due to the tenseless verb in (57'), that
sentence is true if and only if at some time prior to,
simultaneous with, or later than the time of its produc-
tion, the barn is west of where I am when I utter it.
By contrast, however, the present-tense
(59) The barn is west of here
is true if and only if the barn is
—
when I utter the
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sentence—west of where I am when I utter the sentence.
We needn't dwell on these matters, however, since
even though an egocentric reading of indexicals may lend
some plausibility to T3» there remains a very grave
problem with this thesis, and with Goodman's approach
to free repeatability in general, which vitiates any
attempt to analyze tensed sentences along Goodmanian
lines. The problem is that no form of a Goodmanian
free repeatability thesis could be used to describe
English
. It is doubtful
,
in fact
,
whether any ordinary
language would be properly described by such a view.
The difficulty is that, like a number of other
philosophers, Goodman appears to think that tensed sen-
tences contain—if not a genuine though perhaps tacit
reference to time—at least something very much like
this. Thus he says^ that tensed sentences 'indicate*
55 [G12], p. 565.
when they are produced and when what they describe
happens . It is for this reason that replicas of a
tensed sentence uttered at different times are not
supposed to translate each other; each replica indicates
a different time of utterance.
This view seems to have the disastrous consequence
that the same claim cannot be made on different occasions
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by two tensed sentences. If I say 'Caesar crossed the
Rubicon' and then later you say 'Caesar crossed the
Rubicon', we must be making different claims, since the
sense of the verbs in our sentences are relativized to
different times. Moreover if I say 'Socrates is sitting'
and then later you say 'Socrates was sitting' we must
again be making different claims, since each sentence
says something about or 'indicates' a different time of
utterance. This, of course, does not square with the
brute facts of ordinary discourse. We can make the
same claim at different times with tensed sentences.
I suppose one might take a skeptical view about
this and argue that although we may think that we can
make the same claim at different times with replicas
of a tensed sentence, an analysis of such sentences shows
this to be illusory. It is not unusual for us to be
wrong about many 'facts' of ordinary life.
But this seems too high a price to pay for a
Goodmanian analysis of tensed sentences, or any analysis
according to which temporally separated replicas of a
tensed sentence have different senses or meanings . If
the instability of tensed sentences can be explained
only by denying that ordinary language is coherent, then
we should be more willing to accept that result. Fortu-
nately we are not faced with that problem. Later I
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®^-^-ll oSfBT1 an account; of tensed sentences that adequately
explains their variability or instability, and which also
does not force us to take the above kind of skeptical
view of ordinary language.
Finally, the following curiosity is worth our
attention. Consider again
(10) The glass was full
(10') (Et)(t [is] earlier than & the
glass [is] full at t)
(10") The glass's being full [is] earlier than
As I have already noted, (10') and (10") are thought
by some philosophers to provide tenseless translations
of (10), where the blank is replaced by, for example,
the token-reflexive 'this utterance', a date, or 'now'.
All I want to point out here is that, if tenseless
sentences are freely repeatable, in any of the senses
discussed, not all versions of (10') and (10") are tense-
less. Even in the absence of a theory of token-reflexives
and other indexicals and temporal indicators, we can see
that the expressions 'this utterance' and 'now' are such
that the sentences in which they occur are not freely re-
peatable. Since these expressions have different refer-
ents each time they are produced, not all replicas of
(10*) and (10") translate (10), and it is possible that
some of these replicas have truth-values different from
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that of (10) • By substituting a date or time-coordinate
for the blank in (10') and (10 n ), however* these ex-
pressions seem to be freely repeatable.
Son of Free Repeatability
An interesting variant of a Gale-type analysis of
tensed sentences, in which emphasis is placed on the
relativity of truth-values of such sentences, is an
account suggested by Massey^. Massey's presentation
56In [M63.
is rather sketchy, but a fuller analysis would have ex-
ceeded the scope of his book. In any case, we can get
a clear enough idea of his position to see that it is
false
•
Massey's intuition is that the relativity of truth-
values of tensed sentences is explained by the predicates
in such sentences. Massey calls these predicates 'tensed'
predicates
.
...The extension of the predicate '0 is
a Cretan'
,
when that predicate is taken as
tenseless, is the set of all persons who are
now, have been, or will be Cretans. But if
taken as tensed, the predicate ' 0 is a Cre-
tan' has the set of all Cretans who are now
living as its present extension. Notice that
the extension of a tensed predicate is rela-
tive to time and may differ from one moment
to another. For example, Epimenides belonged
to the extension of ' 0 is a Cretan' in the
sixth century, B. C., but he obviously does
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not belong to the extension which that pre-dicate has now. Clearly, therefore, the
reference of a tensed predicate is fully
specified only when its extension at every
moment is indicated. A tenseless predicate
may be thought of as a degenerate case of atensed predicate
,
namely as a tensed predi-
cate whose extension is the same at all
moments. ([M6], p. 404)
Massey goes on to remark that tensed sentences may
be constructed without using tensed predicates, and
using instead special Quantifiers which express present
existence rather than membership in a domain. In such
a case it is not the extension of the predicates of
tensed sentences which changes with time. Rather, the
domain of the quantifier(s) changes from moment to
moment. Thus, if 'F' means '[is] a contemporary of
Plato’, ' (Ex)Fx' is a sentence which is false now, since
none of Plato's contemporaries are currently living, but
which would have been true in Plato's time Past and
37 7
'The intricacies of using such quantifiers are explored
in Cocchiarella: [G2], Prior: [PI], [P2]
,
[P3].
future-tensed quantified expressions would be regarded
as present-tense sentences prefixed by the appropriate
tense operator.
But Massey is not attempting here to describe
ordinary language. Thus we should not construe this
last approach to constructing tensed sentences as a
formula for constructing all kinds of tensed sentences.
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Clearly such an approach is applicable only to quanti-
fied expressions, and probably only to some of those.
Moreover, Massey (following Cocchiarella) combines
tensed predicates with temporal quantifiers in his tense
logic. In fact, all the predicates in this logic are
tensed. The interesting variant of the free repeatability
thesis which we may extract from Massey, then (whether
or not he actually endorses it), places the burden of
tense on predicates. To avoid unnecessary complication,
let us attempt to analyze just grammatically simple
tensed sentences along these lines. Suppose, therefore,
that we take this new version of the free repeatability
thesis to be the following. A simply sentence S is
tensed if and only if its predicate is tensed (i.e.,
has an extension which is relative to time).
This view has some attractive features. Our old
standby
(19) John was fat
counts as tensed, since the extension of '
Q
was fat'
is relative to time. So, too, is
(39) Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo
since the extension of ’ 0 won the Battle of Waterloo'
changed from the time prior to the battle to the time
afterwards. And not surprisingly
(38) The sun will rise tomorrow
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is tensed, since the extension of ' (f) will rise tomorrow’
(while admittedly ambiguous and scientifically inaccurate)
did not include the sun before the creation of the solar
system. Nor will it include the sun after its demise.
By extending this view to compound sentences
,
we
could classify hybrids. A plausible way to do this would
be to say that a compound sentence S is tensed if and
only if one of its components is tensed. Thus
(40) John was a bachelor & bachelors [are]
unmarried
would count as tensed, since the extension of the predi-
cate of the left-hand conjunct can change with time.
This would explain, moreover, why replicas of (40) can
have different truth-values.
But let us consider only the version of the view
that applies to simple sentences. On this view
(57) The barn [is] west of here
is tensed, on either a Goodmanian reading of ’here',
or one according to which ’here’ has temporal import.
In either case the extension of ' (D [is] west of here'
is relative to time, though somewhat indirectly. At
position P, the extension of * © [is] west of here' is
the same at every moment, since the verb is tenseless,
and since
,
therefore
,
the extension of the predicate at
P is the class of things that were, are, or will be west
of P. But if a replica of (57) is produced at P* , the
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predicate ' © [is] west of here' will have a different
extension. And, of course, since any replica of (57)
produced at all must be produced at some time, and since
replicas of (57) can be produced at different places,
the extension of ' (j) [is] west of here' can change with
time. Thus we appear to be able to construct tensed
predicates with tenseless verbs. In fact, since ' © [is]
west of here' is tensed even on the ascetic Goodmanian
reading of spatial indexicals, atemuoral predicates can
be tensed.
This last result (but not the former, as we shall
see later) seems suspicious. While there might be predi-
cates whose extensions change with time, and while it
might prove valuable to study them, it is a mistake to
construe them all as bearers of tense. One of the over-
riding vague intuitions about the subject of tensed
sentences is that such sentences
,
unlike tenseless
sentences, have some kind of temporal significance. And
while it is true that for every position P at which ' ©
[is] west of here' has a certain extension, there is a
time t at which it also has this extension, and thus
while it is true that ' © [is] west of here' can have
different extensions at different positions and times,
this does not seem to be sufficiently temporally signifi-
cant. After all, it seems equally temporally significant
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that sentences like
(1) Red is a color
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4
are true at all times and perhaps irrespective of time.
But the temporal significance of tensed expressions is
such that it would be revealed in a thorough analysis
of the semantics of those expressions. The temporal
significance of (1), (7), and the predicate ' ® [is]
west of here', however, would not be revealed in seman-
tic analysis.
Rather than getting embroiled at this point in a
discussion of the temporal import of tensed expressions,
it would be preferable to reserve this for the next
chapter, since there are more palpable defects with the
view that tensed sentences are those that have tensed
predicates
.
The principal flaw with this view is simply that
some tensed sentences have predicates with non-temporally
relative extensions. In particular we can find quite
a few examples of tensed sentences whose predicates
have the null class as an extension. Two of these are
the already familiar
(44) John was a married bachelor
(45) Nobody has squared the circle
Clearly, the extensions of 1 © was a married bachelor'
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and ' (p has squared the circle' cannot change with time,
since at no time can anyone be a married bachelor or
square the circle. Thus the predicates in (44) and (45)
and hence the sentences themselves count as tenseless.
More interesting, especially for those who still
have qualms about taking analytic sentences as tensed,
is the result that some sentences in the grammatical
future perfect tense also turn out to be tenseless on
this view. Consider, for example,
(64) Elephants will have become extinct by
the 22nd Century
Presumably the extension of ' ® will have become extinct
by the 22nd Century' must be the same at all times. In
the 20th Century, the extension of * (D will have be-
come extinct by the 22nd Century' includes all things
already extinct and all due to become extinct by the
22nd Century. Once into the 22nd Century, however,
membership in the extension of that predicate is, as
it were, closed . Some animals may, of course, become
extinct in the 22nd Century, and thus belong to the
extension of, say, ' &> will have become extinct by the
23rd Century'
,
but once the 22nd Century is reached,
determining the extension of ' CD will have become extinct
by the 22nd Century' will be a matter of historical
research.
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Moreover, if the extension of the predicate in
(64-) could change
,
then it would be possible that at
some time elephants do not belong to the extension of
' ® wil1 have become extinct by the 22nd Century' and
at another time that they do belong to the extension of
bbis predicate . Thus the truth-value of (64-) could change
with time
. But the truth—value of (64-) cannot change
with time. If elephants become extinct before the year
2100 A.D., then any replica of (64-) produced at any time
will be true. And if elephants still exist after 2100
A.D., then a replica of (64-) will at any time be false.
Thus the predicate of (64) is tenseless, even though (64)
is tensed.
It appears, then, that we cannot distinguish tensed
from tenseless sentences along the lines suggested by
Massey. Before presenting what I regard as a satisfactory
analysis of this distinction, however, it will be useful
to consider some issues concerning tenseless languages.
I
t80
CHAPTER III
THE TENSELESS PATTERNS OF ANALYSIS
Tensed and Tenseless Verbs
a. The Temporal Import of Tensed Verbs
It is widely held that tensed verbs are temporally
significant or that they have temporal import, although
the explanations for this alleged phenomenon differ con-
siderably in content. With respect to the English
language alone, the claim many philosophers seem to be
making is that within the class of grammatically inflected
verbs we can distinguish two sub-classes—namely, the
class of tensed verbs (those that have temporal import)
and the class of tenseless -verbs (those that do not have
temporal import). What is supposed to convince us of
this is that
(10) The glass was full
for example, tells us not only about a state of the glass,
but it also tells us when the glass was in this state
—
namely, prior to the time of utterance of (10). It is
this temporal information which is to be eliminated in
a revisionary tenseless language by replacing tensed
verbs with tenseless verbs. (10), with a tenseless
verb, does not indicate at what time or relative to what
time the glass is full.
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What is initially perplexing about this view is
that in most cases we can identify a verb .as tensed or
tenseless only in the context of the sentence in which
it occurs, since tensed and tenseless verbs are usually
morphemically indistinguishable. But this seems to
suggest, not that verbs perform a temporal function or
have temporal import, but that sentences do.
If replicas of
(65) The book is heavy
can in some contexts be temporally informative and in
other contexts
,
such as
(66) (Et)(t is later than & the book is
heavy at t)
not be temporally informative
,
it is not clear why it
should be thought that the verb changes with the change
in context. Moreover, since tensed and tenseless sen-
tences are often morphemically identical, it is not
clear to what extent even these larger linguistic units
perform a temporal function. That is, it is not clear
why the string of symbols or phonemes, 'the book is
heavy'
,
should make less of a claim with respect to
temporal information in tenseless contexts such as (66)
than it would in casual conversation. It seems at least
equally plausible that certain languages or contexts
impose temporal restrictions on the use of certain
strings of symbols or phonemes, and that (65), for
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example, may in some contexts only be used, truly simul-
taneously with the book's being heavy, while in other
contexts, like (66), it may be used truly at any time,
if it can be used truly at some time. And perhaps con-
trary to what is usually taken to be V/ittgenstinian
dogma, the different temporal restrictions on the truth-
conditions of morphemically identical sentences need
not indicate that these sentences differ semantically
in any other way.
Not only is there no good prima facie case for sup-
posing that tensed verbs perform some kind of temporally
informative role, but the respect in which these verbs
are temporally informative has not been explained in
any satisfactory way. In general, the suggestion is
that tensed verbs have a kind of referential function.
It appears to be Quine's view, for example, that in
speaking a tensed language
,
certain information—like
dates—need not be made explicit, since as much infor-
mation as is needed is clear in the context of utterance,
and tensed verbs somehow pick this information out.
. .
.
' was ' . . . involves reference presumably
to some time or occasion implicit in the...
context. ([Ql])
The above summary of Quine's view is unfortunately
rather conjectural, since all Quine says about the tem-
poral function of tensed verbs is that they involve
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reference to times or occasions. But given his views
about the merits of a tenseless language, and his in-
sistence on replacing tensed verbs with tenseless verbs,
it is an inexcusable lapse that he did not bother to
explain in more detail just what linguistic function was
being exorcised in the switch to tenseless verbs. It
is difficult to appreciate the extent to which tense-
less verbs are semantically pristine if we do not know,
what, precisely, is missing from them.
Quine is not the only philosopher to have offered
a perfunctory analysis of the temporal import of tensed
verbs. Mayo claims that tensed verbs date the events
mentioned or described in the sentences in which they
occur.
• • .When. I say that a man is walking or that
an apple ripened, I do much more than attach
the concept of a thing to the concept of an
event so as to form the more complex concept
of an event involving a thing, or of a thing
participating in an event. In addition to
doing this, I am also, in the first place,
asserting the actual occurrence of such an event
and, by implication, the actual existence of
the thing participating in it; and, in the
second place, I am dating the event in re-
lation to the time of utterance of my sentence.
These three roles of the verb (conceptual,
assertive and temporal) correspond to the
philological distinctions: vocabulary (meaning),
mood (indicative), tense (present, past).
(CM43, p. 289)
And Goodman says only that verbs 'indicate' times.
3SCf., p. 11 and [G13], pp. 365ff.
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Notably absent from these discussions is an expla-
nation of how a verb can refer to, indicate, or date
anything when it contains no conspicuous referring ex-
pressions. There might, of course, be some viable no-
tion of covert or tacit reference which would help ex-
plain how expressions without referring singular terms
can nevertheless refer. But no such explanation has been
offered by proponents of this vague view of tensed verbs.
.
Perhaps a more promising approach would have been
to say that tensed verbs connote times or occasions.
Interestingly, some such view seems to have been popular
auong certain Medieval philosophers, 3? who maintained
3T
CS6]t’[S73.
eXamPle
’
Buridan: CB5J. William of Sherwood:
that tensed verbs consipnify times. And these philosophers
very likely adopted the view from Aristotle, who, in
Chapter 3 of De Interpretations, says the following.
A verb is that which, in addition to itsproper meaning, carries with it the notion
oi time
•
...'is healthy’ is a verb; for besides theproper meaning it indicates the present exis-tence of the state in question,
...'he was healthy', 'he will be healthy',
verbs, but tenses of a verb; thedifference lies in the fact that the verbindicates
.
present time while the tenses ofthe verb indicate those times which lie out-
side the present, (trans. by E. M. Edghill)
In any case, the view that tensed verbs connote
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times, or indicate times in some way other than by de-
noting them, may be what some philosophers are driving
at when they argue that tenseless verbs and temporal
coordinates analyze or explicate tensed verbs—that is,
that an expression of the form * [<ps] at t' analyzes or
explicates, say, '<pd'
—
See, for example, Goodman: [Gl$], Russell: [R7], Smart:
CS11].
But, as before, it is not so obvious that tensed
verbs have a connotative function to warrant the omis-
sion of at least a moderately detailed account of what
this function is
,
especially if it is claimed that the
difference between tensed and tenseless verbs is that
the former have temporal connotations and the latter do
not, and if the absence of such connotations from tense-
less verbs is what renders these verbs uniquely appropriate
to certain kinds of discourse. But while we can find
in the literature some discussion of the nature of the
difference between tensed and tenseless sentences , in
relation to the claim that these are distinct classes
of sentences, we cannot find any account of the nature
of the difference between tensed and tenseless verbs,
in relation to the claim that these classes of expres-
sions are likewise distinct.
Perhaps one reason why philosophers have not fully
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elaborated the view that tensed verbs, unlike tenseless
verbs, have temporal connotations, is suggested by an
example offered by Mayo. ^ Newspaper headlines, Mayo
^In [M4]
.
claims, typically discard the date-marking function of
verbs for the sake of vividness. Thus the headline
(67) Jet fighter crashes
is not really a tensed sentence. We presumably know
already that the event mentioned by (67) occurred in
the past; thus it would be superfluous to pack that in-
formation into the headline
. And although Mayo does
not take a stand on this
,
it seems to be his view that
'crashes' in (67) is a kind of tenseless verb.
Whether or not we agree that (67) is a tenseless
4-2 .
sentence, it is interesting to note that even though
52Newspaper headlines are discussed in the next chapter.
'crashes' in (67) may be stripped of its date-marking
function, it is not clear that this verb has been
stripped of its temporal connotations (whatever, exactly,
these are). Presumably an object cannot crash without
doing so at some time. We thus know that the event
mentioned by (67) must occur at some time if it occurs
at all. And this case may be contrasted with cases in-
volving sentences from mathematics. In
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(7) 2 plus 2 is 4
the verb ’is’ has no such temporal connotations. Al-
though sentences such as (7) may be said to be true at
t, in general, temporal information of any kind is
either superfluous to them or unduly restrictive.
Actually, as I shall show later, there are some contexts
in which sentences from mathematics are not atemporal
in this sense, but these may be ignored for the moment.
We want to contrast (67) to those sentences which are
atemporal
.
The moral of these last considerations, then, is
that it may not be very promising, after all, to argue
that tensed verbs have temporal connotations and that
tenseless verbs do not. In particular it is not clear
how a verb like 'crashes' in (67) > or for that matter,
any occurrence of a form of the verb 'to crash', can
be stripped entirely of temporal connotations, since
an object cannot crash except at some time or other,
and every use of the verb presupposes this.
Having made these observations, we are now in a
position to consider in more detail the nature of tense-
less verbs.
b. Atemporal and Omnitemporal Verbs
In spite of the absence of conventions concerning
the morphemic structure of tenseless verbs, semantically
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there is only one tenseless form of a verb. A tense-
less 'is', in other words, is semantically equivalent
to a tenseless ’was'. In English, philosophers often
indicate tenselessness with the so-called 'tenseless
present', a verb form morphemically but not semantically
identical to the present-tense. And as noted before,
^
^See p. 22.
at least one philosopher (Russell) has used a grammati-
cally past-tense verb as a semantically tenseless verb,
presumably for the sake of elegance. Other philosophers,
to avoid confusion or the need to use brackets, italics,
or similar mnemonic devices, use artificial verb forms,
such as the archaic 'be' for the tenseless 'is'.
Whatever constitutes the temporal significance
of a tensed verb, a tenseless verb is supposed to be
devoid of it. As one might expect, verbs which occur
in sentences from mathematics are usually offered as
paradigm cases of tenseless verbs.
...From 'Seven of them remained and seven
is an odd number' one unhesitatingly infers
'An odd number of them remained' , despite the
palpable fallacy of the analogous inference
from 'George married Mary and Mary is a widow'.
One feels the 'is' after 'seven' as timeless,
unlike the 'is' after 'Mary'. ([Q2], p. 170)
Typically, the semantics of verbs in sentences from
mathematics are not explained in any detail, even though
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"fcti6 reader is expected to und.6rst3.nd. how verbs from non-
mathematical tenseless sentences are similarly atemporal
(or timeless).
Smart, for example, has written
...the tenseless 'present' which we get
in mathematics, as when we say that m is an
irrational number. When we say that tt is an
irrational number we do not mean that it is
now an irrational number. ([310], p. 226)
...Within scientific theory we of course
use "is" in a tenseless sense: 'the eclipse
of the moon is at t
' ,
when said earlier or
later than t, of course does not mean that
the eclipse of the moon is at that time at
t. ([S10], p. 256)
Smart's analysis of tenseless verbs goes no deeper
than this, even though—like Quine—he insists on the
merits of a revisionary tenseless language. The sense
in which his treatment of tenseless verbs is typical is
that he tells us a way in which we are not to understand
tenseless verbs and sentences, but he does not tell us
which of various alternative readings is correct (if,
indeed, there are any). What we are usually told is
merely that tenseless sentences do not indicate that the
44
events they mention or describe are past, present, or
)i /i
Assuming, apparently, that events can be described or
mentioned in sentences whose referring expressions denote
things , cf., Chapter II, section 2.
future—that is, that we cannot infer, for example,
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'S is now (was, will
Cf
•
,
the quotation
be) <p* from 'S [is] cp'
from Gale on pp. 17-18.
And
,
as
I suggested earlier, it is not even clear that such
claims about sentences can be construed as claims about
the verbs in those sentences, as Smart seems to do in
the passages just quoted, and also in the following
passage
•
In what follows I shall want to make use
of tenseless verbs. I shall indicate tense-
lessness by putting these verbs in italics.
Tenseless verbs are familiar in logic and
mathematics. When we say that two plus two
equals four we do not mean that two plus two
equals four at the present moment. Nor do
we mean that two plus two always equalled
four in the past, equals four now, and will
always equal four in the future. This would
imply that two plus two will equal four at
midnight tonight, which has no clear sense.
(LS11), p. 135)
But even if we assume that it makes sense in the
first place to take verbs as either having or failing
to have temporal significance, it is not obvious, as
we saw at the end of the previous section, how some
verbs can be atemporally tenseless. We can perhaps get
a rough intuitive idea of the sense in which the verbs
in
(1) Red is a color
(7) 2 plus 2 is 4-
for example, are supposed to have no temporal import,
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but the exigencies of constructing a revisionary tense-
less language according to the first pattern of analysis
are such that verbs in other sorts of contexts must also
be considered tenseless. But how can such verbs as
'crashes' in (67) or 'dines' in
(68) (Et)(t is earlier than & John
dines with Mary at t)
be tenseless? If a tenseless verb is devoid of temporal
import, then it seems that these verbs are not tense-
less, since if something is said to crash, or if two
people are said to dine, it is presupposed that these
events occur at some time or other. It is thus not clear
how the verbs 'to crash' and 'to dine' can be as free
of temporal significance as the verbs in (1) and (7)
are supposed to be.
In a tenseless language constructed solely ac-
cording to the second pattern of analysis, in which the
only tenseless verb is 'is', there may be a similar
difficulty. Ignoring the problem of translating sen-
tences of a thing-language into event-language sentences,
why must we suppose that the 'is' in
(69) John's dining v/ith Mary is earlier than
is as temporally insignificant as the 'is' in (1) and
(7)? In (69) 'is' occurs in a verb phrase which ex-
presses a temporal relation. And as long as we are
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allowing that it makes sense to say that verbs can have
temporal import, it seems more plausible to take the
'is' in (69) as meaning something like ' is-eternally
'
rather than ' is-atemporally'
,
in which case it would
not seem to be temporally insignificant.
Since I think it is unnecessary to rely on some
account of tensed and tenseless verbs to explain the
distinction between tensed and tenseless sentences, I
do not intend to press this point about the second
pattern of analysis any further. I merely want to note
that, granting the plausibility of saying that verbs
can have temporal import, there are no obvious compelling
reasons for supposing that the 'is' in (69) is semanti-
cally equivalent to the 'is' in (1) and (7). Nor have
any compelling reasons been advanced in the literature.
Let us continue to consider, then, whether verbs
other than 'to be' can be stripped of their temporal
import. In response to the above suggestions that verbs
such as 'to crash' and 'to dine' do not have atemporal
forms, one might argue that there are two kinds of
tenseless verbs. First there is the class of atemporal
verbs, including such verbs as those in (1) and (7)«
And secondly there is the class of omnitemporal verbs,
including such verbs as 'dines' in (68). The difference
is that while atemporal verbs are completely devoid of
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temporal import, omnitemporal verbs are, as it were,
merely temporally neutral. If * 9 * is an atemporal
verb
,
then somehow temporal considerations are inappro-
priate both to its sense and to its use. That is, not
only does ' 9 * not mean something like * cp. . . •
,
where the
blank is filled in by temporal information of some kind,
but 'cp' cannot be used at the wrong time in the way in
which an instance of ’was' would be inappropriately used
to describe a future event. But if * 9 ' is an omni-
temporal verb, although it also cannot be used at the
wrong time (though, of course, like any predicate,
atemporal and omnitemporal verbs may be wrongly used in
other ways), it means ' 9a or 9s or will 9 '.
4-6
Sellars draws a similar distinction. Using his
WIn [S3], pp. 533-534.
vivid terminology we could say that atemporal verbs are
perspective-free while omnitemporal verbs are perspective-
neutral
,
where the perspective, of course, is temporal.
...One can find a place for the ’tenseless
present' in the formulation of temporal state-
ments without assimilating this tenseless
present to the tenseless present of mathemati-
cal statements. For it would obviously be
perfectly legitimate to introduce a use of
'is' in accordance with the schema
(19) x is 9 at t = Either x was cp at t or
x is 9 at t or x will be 9 at t
([S3], P- 533)
...Instead of construing tensed verbs as
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the enrichment of a neutral "stripped, down"
'perspective-free' mode of making temporal
assertions, the device of using 'perspective-
neutral' sentences to make temporal state-
ments may rest on and presuppose the tensed
verbs of ordinary discourse. ([S3], pp. 533-
What is interesting about distinguishing atemporal
from omnitemporal verbs is that—as Sellars suggests
—
verbs in the latter class are really tensed. Certainly
the omnitemporal 'dines', for example, is not devoid
of temporal import. But what is more important is that
it turns out to be an abbreviation for 'dined or dines
or will dine', where each of these verbs is, of course,
tensed.
The consequence of this—which is why Smart
A/7
* I
57In [Sll], pp, 137ff
•
objects to it—is that omnitemporal verbs do not, after
all, avoid the philosophical and scientific pitfalls of
ordinary tensed discourse. Most, if not all, of . the
important semantic deficiencies are retained. The ornni-
temporal 'dines' is as temporally biased (as Quine might
say) or anthropocentric (as Smart would say) as the
Cf., the passages from Quine and Smart on p. 10.
tensed verbs whose disjunction it abbreviates, since it
gets its sense from just those expressions responsible
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for that bias or anthropocentricity. Omnitemporal verbs
are therefore inappropriate for Quine and Smart’s rigo-
rous tenseless language. And since it is not clear how
verbs such as ’dines' in (68) can be totally stripped
of their temporal significance like the verbs in (1)
and (7), it might be that the sort of full-fledged
tenseless language envisioned by these authors could
never get off the ground.
We should note, further, that not all verbs can
be read omnitemporally
,
since, semantically
,
not all
verbs have past, present, and future-tense forms. Con-
sider, for example, an achievement verb like 'to win'.
The past and future-tense forms of the verb can be used
to report and predict, respectively, past and future
victories; we can say 'John won the race' or 'John will
win the race'. But the present-tense 'John is winning
the race' does not report a victory of John's. Rather
it says that John is currently in the lead.
We may contrast the verb 'to win' with the verb
'to smile'. When we say 'John smiled', 'John is smiling',
or 'John will smile', we are in each case attributing
a smile to John. But we do not ascribe a victory to
John when we say 'John is winning the race', whereas
we do report or predict that John is victorious when we
say 'John won the race' or 'John will win the race'.
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Moreover, if we cannot ascribe victories to John in the
present-tense of 'to win', then the following schema
(70) (Et)(t is simultaneous with & John
wins at t)
constructed according to the first pattern of analysis,
cannot be used to express'
(71 ) John is winning
since (70 ) reports a victory and (71 ) does not.
Attempts to explain the sense in which certain
(apparently non-atemporal) verbs are tenseless by saying
that they are omnitemporal is therefore doomed for two
reasons. The first is that omnitemporal verbs, when they
can be formed at all, are really tensed, and secondly,
a large number of verbs, which cannot be construed as
having atemporal forms, do not have omnitemporal forms
either.
Moreover, if certain verbs cannot have an atemporal
form, it does not help to say as Smart does, that the
^In [Sll], pp. 138-139.
copula in both
(72 ) x is (p at t
(73) 7 is a prime number
is tenseless (atemporal) but that the predicates differ,
the former being appropriate to denizens of space-time
and not to objects of mathematics. Thus, for Smart,
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sentences about spatio-temporal objects can be tenseless
in the same sense as sentences about eternal objects.
But the problem with this is that we cannot always dis-
tinguish the copula from the predicate in a verb phrase,
as, for example, in
(74) John [runs] at t
We have already seen that Smart is willing to allow that
'to run' has a tenseless form. But what part of '[runs]
5
°Cf., p. 11.
at t' can Smart say is atemporal like the 'is' of 'is
a prime number'? It cannot, as we have seen, be 'runs'.
Smart's contention that different kinds of tense-
less sentences have systematically different sorts of
predicates would also be of little use to proponents of
the second pattern of analysis, for whom 'is' is the only
verb with a tenseless (atemporal) form. The reason for
this is that it is not difficult to find cases where a
verb phrase appropriate to space-time occupants is morphe-
mically identical to a verb phrase appropriate to mathe-
matical objects, as, for example, in the sentences
(75 ) The number of persons smoking at t
[is] 4
(7) 2 plus 2 [isj 4
(76) John's decision to leave [is] irrational
(77) Tr Cis] irrational
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It thus appeaps difficult to specify which predicates
are appropriate to which kinds of objects.
There are, by the way, passages from Smart which
suggest that he really does not think that modifiers
like 'at t', 'before t', etc., should be parts of predi-
cates. Instead, he appears to suggest that these phrases
should be appended to subject-phrases
. where the objects
being denoted are four-dimensional time-slices of an
individual's entire space-time history. In the next
section I will examine this view in some detail.
It is worth mentioning that there are, in the
literature, at least two additional suggestions for
defining tenseless verbs in terms of tensed verbs. They
pose no special problems, however, and, like omnitemporal
verbs, incorporate the semantical defects of the tensed
verbs in the definientia. The first of these suggestions
is to take the tenseless 'is', for example, as equiva-
lent to the tensed 'is and always has been and always
will be '. 51
C4
7 C. J. F. Williams (in [W$]) mistakenly attributes this
definition to Prior. In any case, he seems to endorse
it himself.
The second kind of 'tenseless' verb appears to be
just a special case of omnitemporal verbs, and was
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suggested by Goodman. Such verbs are defined as con-
^In [G133, p. 367.
.junctions of their present, past, and future-tense forms.
We get these verbs whenever we define a verb as the
negation of an omnitemporal verb. Goodman's example,
from the Calculus of Individuals (changing the symbolism
slightly) is 'abb' (i.e., a [is discrete from] b), de-
fined as '~aOb' (i.e., a [overlaps] b). Obviously, since
'aOb' =df 'a overlapped b or a overlaps b or
a will overlap b'
'aDb* is
~(a overlapped b or a overlaps b or a will
overlap b j
and by DeMorgan's rules
[~(a overlapped b) & ~(a overlaps b) & ~(a
will overlap b)]
and, presumably, by a tacit application of the principle
that both tensed and tenseless forms of a verb may be
analogously defined, 'aDb' is
(a was discrete from b & a is discrete from
b & a will be discrete from b)
Actually, this tacit principle, which seems to be
required to get Goodman's results, is false. As tense
logic has made clear, it matters considerably where we
place a negation sign in a past or future-tense expres-
sion. Taking only the past-tense case, in English, the
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unformalized 'John did not attend school', for example,
is ambiguous between 'it was not the case (at some time t)
that John attends school' and 'it never was the case that
John attends school'# These would be formalized, respec-
tively, by the Prior-type expressions 'P~(p)' and '~P(p)',
where 'P(p)' is 'it was the case that p'
,
and where 'p'
is a schematic letter replaceable by present-tense sen-
tences* The latter of these two formulae—that is,
'~P(p)'—corresponds formally to the tensed '~(a over-
lapped b)', which, if re-parsed into that form, would
read inelegantly as 'it is (now) not the case that it
was the case that a overlaps b' (i.e., a never overlapped
b). But to make Goodman’s trick work, the tilde in
'~(a overlapped b)' must, as it were, be inside the
parentheses (as part of the verb), if we want to end
up with 'a was discrete from b'. It is consistent with
the past-tense 'a was discrete from b' that a overlapped
b at some other time in the past* But *~(a overlapped
b)' means 'a never overlapped b', or, in other words,
'a was always discrete from b'.
Y/e can make this more perspicuous as follows. It
is often useful in Prior's systems to define 'P(p)' as
'~H~(p)', where ’H(p)' is 'it has always been the case
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53that p' • Thus '~H~(p)' reads 'it is not the case that
^Sometimes 'H(p)' is defined as '~P~(p)'.
it has always been the case that it is not the case that
P'» or more intuitively, 'it has not always been the case
that it is not the case that p'—that is, 'it was the
case that p'. Goodman wants to get from '~P(aOb)' to
'P(aDb)'. But if anything is to get us to 'P(aDb)' it
is likely to be 'P-(aOb)'. '~P(aOb)', on the other hand,
is equivalent to '—H~(aOb)', or by double negation,
'H~(aOb)'. This problem also afflicts the future-tense
case, as can be seen by adjusting the formalism slightly,
substituting the future-tense operator 'F' (it will be
the case that.*.) for 'P' and *G' (it always will be the
case that...) for 'H'.
Thus it appears that Goodman cannot sustain the
view that some tenseless verbs may be defined as a con-
junction of their simple-tensed forms, where the con-
junction is derived in the manner explained above.
Without the suspicious principle that tensed and tense-
less forms of a verb may be analogously defined, what
we can infer from
[~(a overlapped b) & ~(a overlaps b) &
~(a will overlap b)]
is
(a was always discrete from b & a is discrete
from b & a will always be discrete from b)
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which is actually the first additional kind of tenseless
verb mentioned above. Thus the special case of omni-
temporal verbs is not a conjunction of simple-tensed
expressions, and the two additional suggestions for
tenseless verbs reduce to one.
We see, then, that in addition to problems with
translating certain kinds of tensed sentences into
tenseless sentences according to the tenseless patterns
of analysis, some rather fundamental questions can be
raised about one of the principal devices used for
de-tensing sentences—namely, tenseless verbs. More-
over, it appears that it may even have been a mistake
to suppose that verbs in bensed sentences are in some
sense temporally informative
,
and that a change in the
temporal content of a verb explains how a string of
phonemes or symbols may in one case be tensed and in
another case be tenseless. Indeed, we shall see later
that an account placing the burden of tense on tensed
and tenseless verbs is inadequate for languages which
have tensed sentences but whose verbs have no grammatical
inflections
,
and especially for languages which often
do not even use verbs.
Tensed Sentences and Physics
Smart and Quine are prominent among philosophers
10$
wh.o hold the view that a tenseless language is properly
used to talk about the objects of modern physical theory,
rather than the objects of ordinary language, which sire
subject to the vagaries of change and temporal becoming.^
' '
See Smart: [S10J
,
[Sll], [S12]
,
Quine: [Ql], [Q2], [Q3],
and also Earman: [El], Williams: [W4], Wilson: [W?], [V/8 J
.
V/hat these philosophers propose is that we supplant our
ordinary talk about the three-dimensional changing occu-
pants of the world with talk about the four-dimensional
inhabitants of space-time.
Smart, for example, writes
A man or stone or star is commonly regarded
as a three-dimensional object which neverthe-
less endures through time. This enduring
through time clearly brings a fourth dimension
into the matter, but this fact is obscured by
our ordinary language. In our ordinary way
of talking we stress the three-dimensionality
of bodies, and by our notion of the permanent
in change we conceal the fact that bodies
extend through time. For philosophical reasons,
therefore, it is of interest to discuss a way
of talking which does not make use of the
notion of the permanent in change.
...Instead of talking of things or processes
changing or not changing we can now talk of
one time slice of a four-dimensional entity
being different or not different from some
other time slice. (Note the tenseless par-
ticiple of the verb ’to be' in the last
sentence •
)
When we think four-dimensionally
,
there-
fore, we replace the notions of change and
staying the same by the notions of the simi-
larity and dissimilarity of time slices of
four-dimensional solids. ([Sll], pp. 132-133)
One cannot talk about such four-dimensional objects
without specifying a time coordinate, and Smart seems
to waver between two methods of indicating this temporal
information. In fact, his failure to point out that
he employs both methods suggests either that he saw no
difference between the two, or that he regarded any
such differences as too insignificant to mention.
One way to talk about four-dimensional objects,
Smart suggests, is to add modifiers roughly of the forms
at t
,
before t
' ,
or 'after t' to the predicates of
ordinary language, the verbs of which would then all be
considered tenseless (atemporal) .55 Thus, objects
55Cf., [Sll], pp
Smart on p. 11 a
by Duncan-Jones
:
. 134-ff
. ,
and the passage auoted from
bove. Similar positions arc exprcssc
[D5], and Russell: [R7], [R9J.
A
VX
described by these tenseless sentences would not be said
to be just red or heavy or full, simnliciter. Instead,
they would be said to be red at (before, after) t,
heavy at (before, after) t, or full at (before, after)
t. Therefore we might say of the entire space-time
individual, John, that he is fat-at-t.
Alternatively, we might ascribe properties to
time-slices—that is
,
four-dimensional cross-sections
of space-time individuals. Thus, instead of saying that
John is fat-at-t, we would say of some time-slice,
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»
that it is fat. 56 Smart appears to advocate
C/L
J For a discussion of these two styles of tenseless
language (in a somewhat different context), see Wilson:
LW7J, [W8]
,
and his critic, Prior: [P9].
time slice talk in the passage quoted above
,
and also
in the following representative selection.
...What we express in our ordinary language
representation by saying that the spherical
cricket ball becomes ellipsoidal we express
in our four-dimensional representation by
saying that the three-dimensional cross-section
for t = t, is spherical and that the three-
dimensional cross-section for t = t* is
ellipsoidal. ([S12J, reprinted in [Gl], p. 164)
Quine also regards a tenseless language as the
appropriate medium for discussing the objects of physics.
...Logical grammar, like modern physics,
is best served by treating time as a dimension
coordinate with the spatial dimensions; trea-
ting date, in other words, as just another
determinable on a par with position. Verbs
can then be taken as tenseless. Temporal
predicates, such as the two-place predicate
’is earlier than', belong in the lexicon on
a par merely with predicates of position or
color or anything else. Any temporal details
that we may want to include in a sentence,
in the absence of tensed verbs, we may add
explicitly in the same way that we might add
details of position or color.
A body is thus visualized eternally as a
four-dimensional whole, extending up and down,
north and south, east and west, hence and ago.
A shrinking body is seen as tapered toward
the hence; a growing body is tapered toward
the ago.
We might think of a -physical object... as
simply the whole four-dimensional material
content, however sporadic and heterogeneous,
of some portion of space-time. ([Q3], P* 50;
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•••The space-time view helps one appreciate
that there is no reason why my first and fifth
decades should not, like my head and feet,
count as parts of the same man, however dis-
similar. ( [Q2]
,
p. 171)
The importance for logic of discussing four-dimen-
sional objects tenselessly is considerable, according to
Quine
.
...Think how awkward it is, without [a four-
dimensional] view, to make sense of applying
a predicate to something that no longer exists;
or to make sense of quantifying over objects
that never coexisted at any one time, and
assembling such objects into sets. ([Qq],
P. 3D
For the most part, Quine seems to endorse time-slice
talk as opposed to talk of entire space-time individuals
with temporally restricted properties. Thus he urges
that we replace talk of the cat, Tabby, with talk of
Tabby-at-t • r Quine explains expressions like 'Tabby
^See [Q2]
,
p. 174 .
at t' as follows,
...We are to think of t as an epoch of any
desired duration and any desired position
along the time axis. Then where x is a
spatio-temporal object, we can construe 'x
at t' as naming the common part of x and t.
([Q2], p. 172)
reserving complications arising from taking the time
variable as ranging over durationless point-instants
for later in the book.
Smart's failure to distinguish these two approaches
107
to discussing four-dimensional objects and their proper-
ties often makes for curious reading. Immediately after
introducing time-slices in [Sll ], 58 he begins eliminating
—
g
In the passage quoted on p. 103
.
tensed verbs in favor of tenseless verbs and temporal
modifiers, without trying to employ singular terms
denoting time-slices.
^ See Smart’s remarks on de-tensing quoted on p. 11.
Shortly thereafter, Smart writes
...In the four-dimensional way of talking,
of course
,
we must not say even that things
come into existence—we replace talk of a
building coming into existence at t by talk
of the earliest time slice of the building
being [the italics indicate tenselessness
j
at t. ([Sll], p. 133)
If Smart is here offering an example or description of
time-slice talk, he is at least very misleading. In
time-slice talk it is redundant to say that a time-
slice i£ [tenseless] at t, since that time-coordinate
must already have been given in order to pick out the
time-slice we are interested in. To say that the building
comes into existence at t, we need only identify a
certain quadruple of values for the building's (x,y,z,t)
space-time coordinates as one of the extremities of
that building's world-line.
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Another interesting example of Smart's tendency
to slip out of time-slice talk is the following.
Since time is already involved in space-
time, we cannot speak of change in space-
time in any sense other than of some parts
of space-time being different from others.
In this last sentence 'being' is of course
not a true present tense, but is the tense-
less 'present' which we get in mathematics....
Instead of saying that a body changes from
being red to being green we should say that
an earlier spatial cross-section of the
(four-dimensional) space-time body is (tense-
lessly) red and that a later one is (tense-
lessly) green. Again, it is clearly illegiti-
mate to speak of a body or a signal moving
through space-time. The concept of motion
is now replaced by the notion of the rela-
tive inclinations of world-line 3 . Thus in
Figure 7
the particles AB and CD are further away
from one another at t* than they are at
t, • Similarly, instead of saying that the
relative motion of the second with respect
to the first is greater at t, than at tA ,
we say that the inclination of one world-
line with respect to the other is greater
at t, than at t A • ([S10J, p. 226)
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When he discusses a body changing colors, Smart
is apparently urging time-slice talk, since he suggests
that we talk in terms of the properties of cross-sections
of space-time individuals. But what Smart does next
is to talk about the world-lines A3 and CD and their
properties and relations at certain times . But rather
than discussing the properties of two world-lines
(representing two space-time individuals) at different
times, he should be discussing the properties of pairs
of time-slices, or of computed intervals between time-
slices, thus giving the value for the t-variable simply
by indicating which objects are being denoted.
It is not clear to what extent we are entitled to
slip from talk of entire space-time individuals to talk
of time-slices, or conversely, even for our purposes.
I will, in fact, suggest one problem afflicting only
time-slice talk. But whether or not these two space-
time languages can be regarded as interchangeable for
most purposes, it does seem to be worth noting that
Smart is not very careful in adhering in practice to
the time-slice talk he endorses in most cases.
With respect to eliminating talk of change of
three-dimensional bodies, then, the two views suggested
by scientifically oriented philosophers like Smart and
Quine would be something like the following. While in
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languag© we say that a poker is hot and. then
cold, it is more accurate to say that the .poker-at-t
[is] hot, and the poker-at-t* [is] cold, and of course
that t ^ t*. Or, rather than saying that the poker-at-t
[is] hot, we might prefer to say that the poker [is]
the object in a specifiable region of space-time which
[is] hot—at—t. The sense in which the poker does not
change, then, is that it does not acquire or lose
properties. Different temporal stages (or four-dimen-
sional cross-sections) of the poker (or poker's space-
time worm) have properties that other stages (or cross-
sections) do not have. When the poker-at-t [is] hot
and the poker-at-t* [is] cold, it is not the case that
at t' the poker has changed, since the poker-at-t [is]
still hot, or alternatively, the poker [is] still hot-at-t.
This is analogous to saying that a three-dimensional
poker that is hot at one end and cold at the other does
not change. It is simply hot-at(place) p and cold-at-p'.
Or, the poker-at-p is hot, while the poker-at-p* is
cold. We do not call this a change in the poker; nor
should we call the analogous situation with space-time
occupants change. A similar view of the objects of
physics has been urged—in a slightly different context
—
by Donald Williams.
...The 'change* of a leaf's color from day
to day is of the same denomination as its
Ill
'change* from inch to inch of its surface.(WO, reprinted in [Gl], p. 116)
Since a significant group of philosophers has found
time-slice talk attractive, perhaps it would have been
worthwhile to note earlier that the first pattern of
analysis, which appears to employ temporally restricted
predicates, might have been given an additional formu-
lation. That is, instead of analyzing
(18) John will be (is now, has been) fat
as
(17) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with
,
earlier than) & John [is] fat at t)
some philosophers might have preferred to analyze (18) as
(17’) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with,
earlier than) & John-at-t [is] fat)
As the first pattern of analysis was originally
presented, however, it was left open what kind of objects
certain of the singular terms in these schemata—namely,
those ordinarily thought to denote three-dimensional
physical objects—were to refer to. For the sake of
generality, this was just as well, since some of the
philosophers who like to analyze tensed sentences
according to the first pattern of analysis do not suggest
that objects other than three-dimensional objects are
being denoted by these singular terms in the derived
tenseless sentences. Moreover, any criticisms pre-
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viously lodged against the first pattern of analysis
could also have been directed against this additional
form of that analysis.
And as far as I can see, only one additional
puzzle worth noting would. have arisen had we taken the
first pattern of analysis to be a means for re-expressing
tensed sentences into time—slice sentences. This nuzzle
concerns the sense of the predicates said to be true of
time-slices.60 Put very simply, it is not clear how
Geach raises this problem in [Gil].
some predicates generally held to be true of three-
dimensional changing individuals can be true cf time-
slices. Although we can perhaps understand how an entire
space-time individual, Fido, can be said to bark-at-t
or be hungry-at-t, it is not at all clear what it means
to say that the time-slice Fido-at-t barks or is hungry .
Time slices simply do not bark or get hungry; dogs do,
however. And not even proponents of time-slice talk
maintain that a dog is the same thing as a dog-slice.
Perhaps what is needed for time-slice talk is a
special kind of predicate. Thus while dogs bark, it
might be argued that dog-slices bark*, where 'bark*'
is a special kind of slice-predicate . How we are to
understand such predicates is a matter requiring some
113
explanation. In any case, it is not obvious that an
insuperable difficulty has been posed here for proponents
of time—slice talk, although this problem would seem to
warrant their attention.
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CHAPTER IV
THE TRUTH-CONDITIONS OF TENSED SENTENCES
Truth-Conditions and Truth-Value Instability
Having examined the major distinctions between
tensed and tenseless sentences, and having furthermore
considered the defects of these distinctions, I shall
now offer what I regard as a satisfactory account of
tensed and tenseless sentences. This account is, I
think, in the spirit of most authors who have tried to
explain what such sentences are. Moreover it is con-
sistent with the intuitions concerning tensed sentences
discussed in Chapter I, and also avoids the problems of
the views already considered.
Keeping in mind, then, that I am still considering
only declarative sentence-events (or tokens) to be
sentences, I shall say that a sentence S is tensed if
and only if it is necessary that for any two moments
of time M and M* (where M / M‘ ) replicas of S produced
61
at those times have different truth-conditions.
cT 1
The modality in this definition is perhaps best under-
stood as logical necessity, where, by ? It rs logically
necessary that p' I mean that p is either a substitution
instance of a logical theorem or is inferred from such
by the use of explicit definitions for its non-logical
expressions
•
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To see that it is necessary that temporally
separated replicas of a tensed sentence have different
truth-conditions, we need definitions of the truth-
conditions for the major forms of tensed sentences.
There are no doubt a variety of ways in which we might
state the truth-conditions of tensed sentences, but I
suspect that they would not differ significantly from
the following.
(a) A past-tense sentence 'S was 9' (or *S
cpd') [is] true if and only if at some
time prior to the time of its production
S [is] 9 (or S [is] cping).
(b) A present-tense sentence 'S is cp * (or 'S
is cping') [is] true if and only if S [is]
9 (or S [is] 9ing) at the time of its
production.
(c) A future-tense sentence 'S will be 9'
(or '3 will 9* ) [is] true if and only if
at some time later than the time of its
production S [is] 9 (or S [is] cping)#
Here
,
the device of bracketing verbs does not indi-
cate that those verbs are tenseless. Rather, it indi-
cates that the truth-conditions of the simple sentence
formed in part by that verb are not relativized to the
time of production of that sentence. We may thus retain
bracketing as a handy mnemonic device , without embracing
the view that verbs are tensed or tenseless.
Schemata (a), (b), and (c) obviously do not cover
all the important forms of simple-tensed sentences.
116
Where past, present, or future-tensed, sentences contain
adverbial clauses roughly of the form 'at-t', we can
make minor adjustments in the above schemata. To take
just the past-tense case
,
we could say
(d) A past-tense sentence 'S was cp at t*
(or *S cpd at t') [is] true if and only
if t [is] some time prior to the time
of its production and S [is] cp at t
(or S [is] cping at t).
Obvious modifications of (d) would be required if, in-
stead of the modifier 'at t*
,
we had used 'before (after)
t*. For example,
(e) A future-tense sentence 'S will be cp
after t' (or 'S will cp after t') [is]
true if and only if at some time later
than the time of its production and also
later than t, S [is] cp (or S [is] cping).
The rather mundane respect, then, in which a tensed
sentence changes truth-conditions from moment to moment
may be put crudely by saying that the temporal scope
of the sentence changes from moment to moment. Another
way of putting this would be to say that what counts
as the time of (or prior to or later than the time of)
a sentence ' s production at M is not what counts as the
time of (or prior to or later than the time of) produc-
tion of a replica of that sentence at M* • Thus, for
example, where M and M' are two moments such that M
is earlier than M*
,
the truth-conditions at M of the
past-tense sentence 'S cpd' are not identical with the
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truth-conditions of that sentence at M'
,
since the period
of time in which S can cp for the sentence to be true
varies from M to H'. In fact, if the only time S cps
is at M, then "S cpd' would be false at M, though true
at M'
.
In some cases, therefore, not only the truth-
conditions but the truth-value of replicas of a tensed
sentence S will differ* As in the above case, for
example, if, upon uttering *S cpd', there is no time
prior to the time of utterance when S cps, then the
sentence will be false* At some later time, however,
a replica of that sentence will be true, if in the period
of time preceding the production of that replica, S cps.
And if S never cps, then 'S cpd' can have only false re-
plicas, even though its truth-conditions change with
each successive replication.
The change in a tensed sentence's truth-condi-
tions, then, is rather subtle in most cases. If two
non-simultaneous replicas of 'S cpd' are produced, then
regardless of when S actually cps (if S cps at all), the
period of time in which S must cp for the first replica
to be true cannot be identical with the period of time
in which S must cp for the later replica to be true. If
the second replica is produced, say, ten minutes after
the first, then the truth-conditions of that replica
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are such that if S cps within that period of ten minutes
(and does not cp at any other time), the replica will be
true, whereas the truth-conditions of the first replica
are such that that replica will not be true if S's only
case of cping occurs within those ten minutes.
There may, of course, be non-temporal respects in
which the truth-conditions of two sentence-replicas
differ. If the sentence contains, say, a spatial in-
dexical like ’here' or the personal pronoun 'I',
replicas of the sentences produced at two different
places or by two different persons will have different
truth-conditions. If these replicas are further pro-
duced at different times and are tensed, there must then
be another respect in which the truth-conditions differ.
Thus the truth-conditions of
(78) The murder took place here
(79) I lost my shoe
can vary from place to place (in the first case) and
from person to person (in the second). But what indi-
cates that these sentences are tensed is that their
truth-conditions must change from moment to moment even
if they were always produced, respectively, at the same
location and by the same person.
We see, then, that this view of tensed sentences
accounts for (what we have been misleadingly calling)
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the truth-value instability of tensed sentences, without
committing the mistake of taking all tensed sentences to
have unstable truth-values.
Change of Sense and the Intricacies of Tensed Discourse
This view of tensed sentences also avoids the error
of supposing that all non-simultaneous replicas of a
tensed sentence differ in sense or advance different
claims, and thus does not need to rely on change of
sense to explain how replicas of tensed sentences change
in truth-value. Although the truth-conditions of, say,
the past-tense 'S <pd* are such that S must cp prior to
its production for the sentence to be true, it is not
being claimed that 'S cpd' means 'S cps (tensed or tense-
less) prior to t (the time of production)', and hence
that temporally separated replicas of 'S cpd ' make
different claims. This, of course, seems compatible
with the facts of ordinary discourse. If you say 'Caesar
crossed the Rubicon'
,
I can agree with you at a later
time by also saying 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'.
Similarly if you say 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' and
I disagree, I can say 'It is not the case that Caesar
crossed the Rubicon' at some later time and still
contradict you.
There is a sense, then, in which non-simultaneous
120
replicas of a tensed sentence can advance the same claim,
even though they do not have the same truth-conditions,
and, moreover, there is a sense in which non-simultaneous
tensed sentences can advance contradictory claims. It
would be useful, of course, to get clear on what, exactly,
is meant in this case by 'same claim'. But this would
require elaborating a reasonably comprehensive theory
of meaning, which would exceed the scope of this thesis.
But even in the absence of a theory of meaning, it should
not be difficult to appreciate that there is an impor-
tant sense in which replicas of a tensed sentence do
make the same claim; we can, after all, agree with each
other at different times—that is, in some sense we can
say the same thing (and not just utter the same string
of phonemes)—by saying, for example, 'Caesar crossed
the Rubicon'
.
It should also be pointed out that not only can
we make the same claim with non-simultaneous replicas
of a tensed sentence S, but we can also make the same
claim (probably in the same sense of 'same claim') with
tensed counterparts of S . That is
,
the claim made by
62This is discussed by Buridan: [B5], and in considerable
detail by Sellars: [S$].
'Caesar crossed the Rubicon', after Caesar had traversed
the river, is the same claim made by 'Caesar will cross
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fch.e Rubicon
,
said before bhab bime. Similarly, bhe
same claim can be made by ' John will visib bhe Whibe
House’, 'John is visibing bhe Whibe House', and 'John
visibed bhe Whibe House', said, respecbively
,
before,
during and afber John's visibing bhe Whibe House.
Tensed discourse has addibional inberesbing
feabures, some of which may seem rabher peculiar. For
bhe mosb parb, however, bhese feabures are familiar
and should nob be explained away as aberranb resulbs
of an incorrecb view of bhis mode of language. One in-
beresbing sibuabion bhab may arise in speaking a bensed
language is bhab ab M (for example) you can say 'S cpd'
and be wrong, since ab bhab bime S may nob yeb have cpd.
Bub ab some laber bime I can agree wibh you and say 'S
cpd* and bhis senbence replica can be brue, provided bhab
S had cpd by bhen.
This phenomenon is easily explained by nobing bhab
albhough bhe bwo senbence replicas make bhe same claim,
bhe earlier replica had differenb brubh-condibions from
bhe laber one. If bhey had had bhe same brubh-condi-
bions, bhey would nob only have had bhe same sense or
meaning, bub bhe same brubh-value.
Some obher inberesbing cases can be found in bhe
sophisms of John Buridan. 0^
63See [B51.
In one sophism Buridan
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thinks that he can establish that a present-tense sen-
tence can be true at a time during which what is occur-
cj±
ring is described by the sentence’s contradictory,
^See [B5], pp. 171-172.
Suppose that at moment M you say 'Socrates is not sitting'
and that Socrates happens to be sitting at H, so that
the sentence you utter is false. Suppose, however, that
at a later moment M' I—in an effort to disagree—say
'Socrates is sitting' and that at that time it so happens
that Socrates is no longer sitting. Since my utterance
of 'Socrates is sitting' at M' is the contradictory of
a false sentence, it must be true, even though Socrates
is not sitting at M'
.
Another such puzzle is posed by Buridan as follows
(we should read 'proposition' as 'sentence', since Buridan
is clearly concerned with the latter).
...If I say 'Socrates is running', you do
not know what proposition I shall say until
I have spoken. So you do not know how to
contradict me until I have spoken, and then
you cannot contradict me
,
because the time
is not the same, which is required for the
contradiction. Indeed, if you say, wishing
_
to contradict me, that Socrates is not running,
it may be that I spoke the truth and that you
also' speak the truth, since when I spoke, he
was running, and when you spoke, he was not
running. But a true proposition never contra-
dicts a true one. ([B5], PP* 170-171)
Buridan resolves this last problem by claiming that the
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verb in the later sentence is to be taken as referring
to (or connoting, perhaps) the same time as the verb
in the first sentence, and that the intent [intentionem]
of the two sentences is the same.
What is more interesting, perhaps, is that Buridan
regards the second, present-tense sentence as the proper
response in both these cases. This accounts, I think,
for the fatal artificiality of his examples. If, in the
second case, I want to contradict your earlier remark,
'Socrates is running', it is not at all clear that the
way to do this is to utter the present-tense sentence,
'Socrates is not running'. In fact, in straightforward
conversational contexts of the sort Buridan is concerned
with, ' the present-tense 'Socrates is not running' is
^Ignoring, that is, cases (say) of lying or pedagogical
utterances of sentences (e.g., 'Consider the sentence
"Socrates is not running"').
appropriate only when the utterer knows or believes that
Socrates is not running at the time of utterance. If
I knew or believed that Socrates was not running at the
time of utterance, the way to disagree with your pre-
vious utterance of 'Socrates is running' would have been
to say—in the past-tense— 'But Socrates was not running
[when you said that]'. Similarly for the first case:
if at M' I knew or believed that Socrates was no longer
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sitting, the way to contradict your previous utterance
of * Socrates is not sitting’ would have been to say,
'But Socrates was sitting [when you said that]'.
The moral of all this seems to be that the way to
contradict a sentence S in ordinary tensed discourse
may not be to utter a sentence which is formally equiva-
lent to ~S. It appears, instead, that sometimes we must
change tense to agree or disagree. Buridan is plainly
wrong, then, in denying that it is proper in ordinary
language to change tense to contradict earlier utterances.
C. (LDDSee [B5], p. 171.
Moreover, it is just this kind of interesting feature
of ordinary tensed discourse that some of the philoso-
phers discussed in previous chapters want to eliminate
in a revisionary tenseless language.
The verbal gymnastics required for speaking care-
fully in a tensed language do not end here. For centuries
philosophers have tried to understand what the present
(or now ) is, and the puzzles they offer carry over into
everyday uses of the present-tense.^ The sophisms just
^See, for example, Augustine: [A6]. Buridan: [B53i Gale:
[Gl], [G4J, [G8], [G10J, Prior: [P6j, [P7], Russell: [R8],
[R9J, Sellars: [S3], Thalberg: [T2].
cited from Buridan, notably, also involve problems with
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the present-tense* But an example of the paradigm case
concerning perplexities with the present is the case
in which we are at a concert and you ask me 'What is now
playing?' • I have, presumably, several options in
answering you. I might say (truly), 'The Emperor Con-
certo is now playing'
,
or more precisely, 'The second
movement of the Emperor Concerto is now playing'
,
or
more precisely still, 'The first eighth-note in measure
47 of the second movement of the Emperor Concerto is nov;
playing'. The problem, of course, with this last answer
is that as long as we choose to be so precise about the
extent of the present, that answer appears to be false
before it is completely uttered, since by the time the
answer is given, another note is being played.
Analogous situations arise quite often in ordinary
discourse. When we are asked 'What are you thinking?',
do we correctly answer (in the past-tense, presumably)
by reporting what we were thinking when the question
was posed, or do we mention what we are thinking while
we mention it? If the former, then we are in the
apparently paradoxical position of answering a question
about our present activities by describing past activi-
ties. If the latter, then we might run into a problem
similar to that encountered in trying to say that a
particular note of the Emperor Concerto is now playing,
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since we might have one thought at the beginning of our
answer and another at the end#
We needn't dwell any longer, here, on the intri-
cacies of speaking a tensed language. Instead, let us
continue considering which sentences are tensed on the
account just given.
Something Old, Something New
Let us first examine some sentences that proved
troublesome for some of the previously considered
accounts of tensed sentences. To begin with, hybrid
sentences, having both tensed and tenseless components,
are tensed on the present (no pun intended) view.
Sentences such as
(40) John was a married bachelor & bachelors
are unmarried
(80) John was fat or 7 is a prime number
are tensed, since the truth-conditions of the tensed
component
,
and hence of the entire sentence
,
must change
from moment to moment. (80), for example, is true if
and only if either at some time prior to its production
John is fat, or 7 is a prime number. And since what
counts as the time prior to the time of production at
one moment is not identical with the period of time
counting as the time prior to the time of production
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at another moment, the truth-conditions of (80) must
change in the same (perhaps minuscule) way as do those
of other tensed sentences.
We can also preserve, on this view, the distinc-
tion between tensed and tenseless analytic sentences.
There are, in other words, certain sentences that appear
to be analytic and that also appear to exhibit the
instability of truth-conditions characteristic of tensed
sentences.
Consider
(44) John was a married bachelor
(81) Nobody is squaring the circle
(4^) Nobody has squared the circle
Even though their truth-values remain invariant through
time, the truth-conditions of these sentences vary in
the same way as do the truth-conditions of the more
ordinary tensed sentences discussed above • With respect
to (44), the time in which John must be a married bache-
lor for (44) to be true must change with each successive
replication. If (44) is to be true at all, John must
be a married bachelor prior to the time of production
of (44), and, as is the case with ordinary tensed sen-
tences, this time changes with each moment of utterance.
But, of course, John can never be a married bachelor;
thus (44) will be false whenever produced.
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Similarly
,
if (81) is to be true, there cannot be
anyone squaring the circle at the time of -its production,
and this time, and hence the truth-conditions of (81),
must change from moment to moment. And, of course, (81)
will always be true, since nobody will ever square the
circle when a replica of (81) is produced.
It is important to distinguish sentences like (81)
and (4-5) from their tenseless modal variants, like
(82) Nobody can square the circle
Our language is rich enough so that we can indicate not
only that something failed to happen, or is failing to
happen, but that it cannot happen at all, and we can
make these distinctions both with respecc to things
which can happen and also to those which cannot.
But (4-5)
,
(81) and (82), of course, are all true,
and it is tempting to say that (4-5) and (81) are true
because (82) is true. But this is rather misleading,
since it might be taken to suggest that all three sen-
tences have the same truth-conditions. However (81)
is true because nobody is squaring the circle while it
is produced, just as
(6) Mary is frowning
is true if and only if Mary is frowning while it is
produced. Of course the reason why nobody is squaring
the circle while a replica of (81) is produced is that
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nobody can do so. But this does not indicate that (81)
and (82) have the same truth-conditions. After all,
(8$) Nobody has seen a live trilobite
(84) Nobody is seeing a live trilobite
are both true, given the facts of Paleontology. In fact,
these two sentences are true because
(85) The extinction of trilobites antedates
man's appearance on earth
is true, just as (45) and (81) are true because (82) is
true. Yet we would not say that (85)-(85) all have the
same truth-conditions, even though in this one sense
they are true for the same reason. Nor, presumably,
would we make the analogous claim with respect to (45),
(81) and (82).
Another class of sentences, some members of which
were problematical on earlier accounts, is the class of
sentences in the future perfect tense. All sentences
in this class count as tensed on the view being con-
sidered. A rough schema giving the truth-conditions
for sentences in the future perfect is the following.
(f) A future perfect tense sentence 'S will
have <pd (before, by t)' [is] true if and
only if prior to some time after the time
of its production, S [cps] (before, by t).
Obviously, what counts as the period of time after the
time of the sentence's production must change from
moment to moment, as it does in the case of an ordinary
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future-tense sentence. Thus the truth-conditions of a
future perfect tense sentence must change slightly
with each successive moment, although the change is
not significant enough to alter the truth-value of the
sentence in most cases.
Omnitemporal sentences also count as tensed on
this view. Since each disjunct in
(5^) S cpd or Sis coing or S will <p
is a tensed sentence, the truth-conditions of these
components must change from moment to moment. And since
the truth-conditions of the components of (5*0 must
change, (5^) is likely to be true at different times
(if true at all) in virtue of the truth of different
components, unlike a paradigm tenseless disjunction.
68Cf., pp. 56ff
.
This, it seems to me, indicates that the truth-conditions
of the entire sentence change. But unlike an ordinary
simple tensed sentence, whose changing truth-conditions
determine when it is satisfied, the changing truth-
conditions of an omnitemporal sentence determine how
it is satisfied at the time of its production. (3^) is
true if and only if S cps at the time of production, or
at some time prior to or later than the time of produc-
tion. And since for each successive replica of (54),
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different periods of tine will be the time of production
and the times prior to and later than that, the periods
of time in which what the sentence reports must occur
for the sentence to be true must change from moment to
moment
•
But the manner in which a sentence like
(53) [is] earlier than E^ 211 E2
earlier than E-,
3
is satisfied does not depend on when
,
relative to the time
of its production in general, what it reports occurs.
The temporal location of E^, E^, and E^ relative to the
time of production of (55) does not determine how or
whether (55) and its replicas are satisfied.
It should also be illuminating to consider whether
sentences in fictional contexts are tensed. We seem
to have two options. On one hand we might say that
fictional sentences are tenseless, since their truth-
conditions do not change. A character in a novel might
remark
(86) George drowned in Lake Michigan
and this sentence will be 'true' in the novel if and
only if George .drowns in Lake Michigan at some earlier
point in the story. But (86) does not have truth-condi-
tions that change with time, since its 'truth' is de-
termined by the story and not by its relation to any-
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thing that occurs in time (except, of course, the writing
of the novel).
Alternatively, and I think more plausibly, we might
say that fictional objects undergo fictional change,
which is modeled after 'real' change (that is, as de-
scribed in ordinary language rather than in a four-di-
mensional language), and that 'tensed* sentences like
(86), reporting fictional occurrences, must be dis-
tinguished from ' tenseless ' fictional sentences like
(87) The hero of this tale is George
said in the course of a narrative. Sentences like (86),
one might argue
,
must always be understood from the per-
spective of the narrative present , to borrow a phrase
from some literary critics. This is true even of fic-
tional sentences in which the (grammatical) present-
tense seems to be used to indicate fictional past events,
as in
(88) ...and then John hits Bill
We might bring these cases more clearly into focus
by considering the following situation. Suppose that,
in a novel
,
John and Bill engage in mortal combat and
that both perish. Suppose, moreover, that this event
was described in the previous chapter, and that we are
now 'viewing' a later series of events. If the narrator
reminds us
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(89) John hit Bill
in the course of his narration in this chapter, his
sentence would be 'true'. However if he had mistakenly
written
(90) John will hit Bill
his sentence would have been 'false'. Moreover had the
narrator written (89) too early in the story (with re-
spect to the narrative present), (89) would have been
’false'. The point here is not that (89) changes • truth*
-
value
,
but that it is variable in a way crucially analo-
gous to the classic tensed sentences discussed earlier.
In fictional time, a sentence may be uttered, say, too
soon, just as in ’real' rime. (89), for example, is
true in uhe story if and only if at some time prior
to the time of its production (relative to the narrative
present), John hits Bill. And, as the narrative present
moves along with the reader, the period of fictional
time in which John must hit Bill for a replica of (89)
to be 'true' keeps changing.
Sentences in further sorts of literary contexts
also warrant examination at this point. In non-fiction
we frequently encounter grammatically tensed locutions
such as
(91)
In an earlier (a later) chapter we
demonstrated (will demonstrate) that...
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Do such locutions form tensed sentences? For reasons
I shall offer below, I am inclined to think this is
somewhat of a toss-up.
On one hand we might argue that both literary
fiction and literary non-fiction presuppose a narrative
present, from the ’temporal' perspective of which we
are to understand sentences in literary contexts. In
some works of fiction, such as Conrad's ITostromo
, the
narrative present skips back and forth over the fictional
time series in which the story occurs. Once we ascer-
tain where (or when
,
perhaps) the narrative present is
at a certain point in the book* we understand how to
construe the narration. This periodic shifting of
temporal perspective within a novel can, in skillful
hands, be a powerful and exciting literary device. Non-
fiction rarely presents such difficulties (or excite-
ment). In these more 'temporally' simplified situations
we might take a locution such as (91) to mean
This analysis would not be undermined, moreover, if the
chapters were either written or read in an order distinct
from their order in the book.
Against these considerations, it might be urged
(92) In a chapter (numerically) preceding
the one now being produced
we demonstrated (will demon-
strate) that...• « •
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that an interpretation of at least non-fictional sentences
from the perspective of the narrative present makes cer-
tain familiar pedagogical locutions impossible to under-
stand, For example, we frequently encounter
(93) In a later .chapter we have demonstrated
that . .
.
(said, for example, in the introduction to a book), the
grammatical past-tense of which would be inappropriate
from the point of view of the narrative present. Thus,
given the proper contexts, both (93) and
(94) In a later chapter we will demonstrate
that • •
•
are acceptable locutions.
Perhaps, then, a more plausible reading than (92)
of expressions like (91) would be
(95) In a chapter (numerically) preceding
(following) this chapter there is a
demonstration that...
where the indexical 'this' is to be understood as being
’temporally’ uninformative—that is, 'this chapter' is
not to be understood as meaning something like 'the
chapter now being read'
•
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Another interesting case is the newspaper headline.
k^See Chapter III, pp. 86-87*
A sentence like
(67) Jet fighter crashes
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occurring as a headline, should probably be understood
as a past-tense sentence. Although it does not have a
grammatically past-tense inflected verb, it seems
plausible that this verb inflection is unnecessary,
given the context in which (67) appears. And, like
other more grammatically orthodox past-tense sentences,
(67) is true if and only if at some time in the period
of time preceding its production, a jet fighter crashes.
Headlines typically dispense with grammatical verb
inflections other than the simple present-tense, and it
is usually clear from context that a past occurrence
is being reported. In the absence of other temporal
modifiers, (67) would normally be understood as ad-
vancing a claim about what previously happened to a jet
fighter. Similarly,
(96) Nixon confers with Agnew
would also be understood as a past-tense sentence.
Future-tense headlines usually retain the infinitive
form of a verb, as, for example, in
(97) Nixon to confer with Agnew
if a straightforward future-tense sentence is not used.
The texts of newspaper stories are usually more
grammatically conventional than headlines, and employ
past-inflected verbs for past-tense sentences, and
future-inflected verbs for future tensed sentences.
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Nevertheless, it appears that if Mayo's position con-
cerning the tenselessness of (67) was accurately de-
scribed in Chapter III, then Mayo was wrong in supposing
that sentences like (67) and (96) are tenseless, simply
because their verbs were deprived of their date-marking
function. Or, put more generously (since it is not
clear that verbs date at all), sentences like (67) and
(96) are not tenseless just because their verbs are not
inflected in certain ways.
It seem3, then, that the tense of a simple tensed
sentence need not be identical with the grammatical tense
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of its verb. We had a hint of this in Chapter II when
7
°Cf., p. 64-.
we considered
(60) Next week I am speaking to the board of
trustees
in which the adverbial phrase 'next week' renders a future-
tensed verb unnecessary.
Having thus liberated ourselves from the fairly
traditional prejudice that the tense of a simple tensed
sentence is identical with the tense of its verb, we
are in a position to consider tensed sentences in
languages other than English, and more interesting
still, we are in a position to consider whether a
tensed sentence must even have an inflected verb at all.
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Tensed Sentences and Natural Languages
Once we see that truth-conditions rather than verb
inflections determine whether a sentence is tensed, it
seems likely that sentences in languages without gramma-
tical tense inflections might nevertheless be semantically
tensed.
We can, I think, ignore complications introduced
by the problem of the indeterminacy of translation. If
we take Quine's problem of radical translation to in-
dicate that no understanding of foreign languages can
be achieved with any security, then there would be little
point in discussing the semantics of sentences in these
languages, since we would presumably have no way of
knowing what the sentences were . But I do not think
that the indeterminacy of translation renders general
linguistics useless, although we may not be able to fix
the reference of terms in a manner suitable for careful
philosophical discussions of ontology.
In any case, should the reader regard indeterminacy
as posing insuperable problems for the study of foreign
languages, then this section should perhaps be passed
over. But it should be recalled that indeterminacy
afflicts the mother-tongue as well, with respect not only
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to other speakers, but also with respect to oneself , r
7T
'See W. V. Quine, 'Ontological Relativity: The Dewey
Lectures 1968'
,
Journal of Philosophy
,
LXV, 7 (April 4,
1968), pp. 185-212; M* C. Bradley," ! How Never to Know What
You Mean', Journal of Philosophy , LXVI, 5 (March 15 > 1969),
pp, 119-124; J. M. Thomason, 'Ontological Relativity and
the Inscrutability of Reference', Philosophical Studies ,
22, 4 (June, 1971).
If one accepts the problems of indeterminacy, then one
accepts not only that there is an important philosophical
sense in which we cannot know what objects speakers of
other languages are securing reference to, but that we
also cannot know what speakers of our language are re-
ferring to, and, moreover, that—to a point at least
—
we cannot even know what we are referring to* It would
seem, then, that if the reader is satisfied that the
claims I have been advancing about the sense of English
sentences are not undermined by the problems of inde-
terminacy, then he should take a similar position with
respect to the claims I make below about Chinese sen-
tences. Even a Quinian should admit, in other words,
that an analysis of the semantics of sentences in
foreign languages is in principle no more (or at least
little more) suspicious than semantical analyses of
sentences in one's own language.
I noted in the Introduction that Finnish sentences
to be about the future and all sentences ofwhich appear
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Chinese, for example, are thought by linguists not to
be tensed, since these sentences exhibit no verb in-
72flections.' As a description of ordinary Finnish and
' See above, n. 2, p. 2.
Chinese syntax, this claim is correct. Both English
and Chinese linguists agree that Chinese verbs are not
1
inflected, although various adverbial modifications can
be made to Chinese verb phrases , which account—as we
shall see—for changes in (semantical) tense. Moreover,
in some Chinese sentences, verbs are entirely dispen-
sable—that is, they may be eliminated without changing
the sense of the sentence in which they occurred.
In the Chinese sentences linguists claim are equiva-
lent to the English 'I went to Peking' and 'I will go
to Peking', the verb form is the same in each case. But
sometimes that particular string of morphemes is true
if and only if I go to Peking after uttering it, and
other times it is true if and only if I go to Peking
before uttering it. Moreover, the Chinese sentence for
'the book is thick' can be expressed with or without
the verb 'to be'. But either string of morphemes is
true if and only if the book is thick upon producing
it*
It appears, then, that Chinese sentences exhibit
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the kind of variability of truth-conditions that I have
claimed is characteristic of tensed sentences, even
though linguists agree that Chinese lacks the grammatical
features in virtue of which sentences of a language are
said to be (grammatically) tensed.
In most cases it is clear in context what the
(semantic) tense of a Chinese sentence is. When this
is not so clear, and for emphasis or specificity in
those cases when it is clear, a speaker of Chinese can
usually add a temporal modifier like ’last week', 'after-
wards', 'recently', 'in the past', 'soon', or 'currently'
to the sentence, much in the manner of (6?) and (60),
discussed earlier. Moreover there is a somewhat infre-
quent case in which past—tense is indicated by a particle
that gets tacked on to the end of a sentence and which
is not suffixed to the verb. Roughly, all this particle
does is indicate completed action^ it indicates, in
other words, the temporal mode in which the sentence is
to be understood.
To be more specific, consider the following
phonetic representations of some Chinese sentences.
(98)
“ Dzwotyan
,
Women chi fan (Yesterday, we
ate rice)
(99) Mingtyan, Women chi fan (Tomorrow, wev
will eat rice)
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Syntactically, the Chinese sentences have the same con-
struction as their English translations. The first word
is a temporal modifier, followed by the first person
plural pronoun, verb, and direct object. But notice
that the only difference between the past-tense and
future-tense sentences is that they have different ad-
verbs. The remainder of the sentence, and in particular
the verb, is the same in each case.
If we prefaced the kernel sentence of (98) and
(99)
with a 'present-tense' adverb like 'today', we
would then have a present-tense sentence. If we left
off the adverb entirely, however, the kernel sentence
would indicate the habitual action of or our disposition
for eating rice. Thus, by dropping the temporal adverb
from the past-tense
(100) Dzwotyan, Women he cha (Yesterday, we
drank tea)
we get the disposition sentence
(101) Women he cha (We drink tea)
Interrogative Sentences
In the Introduction I observed that philosophers
interested in tensed sentences have really been inter-
ested only in declarative sentences. Linguists, on the
other hand, would not balk at calling interrogatives
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with inflected verbs tensed (if, that is, they would not
balk at calling sentences, rather than verbs, tensed in
the first place). The present account of tensed sen-
tences reflects the philosopher's preference for declara-
tives; since interrogatives do not have truth-conditions,
they of course do not count as tensed.
Perhaps, though, there is a sense in which in-
terrogatives may be regarded as semantically tensed.
We can note, first of all, that many interrogatives may
be transformed into a corresponding declarative. Thus
'Will John visit us tomorrow?' becomes 'John will visit
us tomorrow', and 'Did Mary wash her face?' becomes
either 'Mary did wash her face' or 'Mary washed her face'.
Thus we might want to say that an interrogative
sentence S is tensed if and only if S has a declarative
counterpart £>' and S' is tensed.
The difficulty with this position, however, is
that some interrogatives do not have obvious declara-
tive counterparts, although they seem no less tensed
than ' Will John visit us tomorrow?'. For example, 'How
is John?' would seem to have 'John is how' as a counter-
part. Similarly, 'What did you say?' and 'Why did John
beat the butler?' do not seem to have counterparts.
Yet these questions seem as tensed as those previously
mentioned.
Perhaps, though, we can extend the notion of
•declarative counterpart' so that questions like 'How
is John?' can be included in the class of tensed in-
terrogative s • Thus we might say that the counterpart
of 'How is John?' would be a schema of the form 'John
is ... 1
,
where the space would be filled in by some
phrase describing John. Similarly the counterpart oo
'Why did John beat the butler?' would have the tensed
form 'John beat the butler...’, where, again, the space
would be filled in by the appropriate phrase.
We can thus specify the form of some declarative
counterparts without specifying, exactly, what these
counterparts, in general, would be. I-ioreover enough
of the original interrogative is retained in the counter-
part to allow us to distinguish most tensed interrogatives
like 'How is John?' from interrogatives like 'Are you
late for dinner after t?' and "Who is John's date on
1/7/67?', which we might try to think of as the sorus
of questions one asks in a revisionary tenseless language.
The counterparts of these questions would be, respec-
tively, 'You are late for dinner after t', and the
sentence schema*.-' John's date on 1/7/67 is...’. And
of course tensed interrogatives are easily
distinguish-
able from interrogatives like 'Are all bachelors
un-
married?' and "Is red a color?'.
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The above remarks are intended merely to suggest
how we might go about including interrogatives in the
class of tensed sentences, should we regard this in-
clusion as important in the first place. I suspect
that in order to carry the above analysis any further
it would be necessary to present a rather thorough
analysis of the semantics of interrogatives. While the
analysis of interrogatives may prove interesting and
perhaps valuable, this area of research is largely un-
explored. And any attempt here to present a suffi-
ciently complete semantics for interrogatives would
no doubt exceed the scope of this dissertation.
In any case it does not seem all that pressing
to deal with interrogatives, since if the above sugges-
tions for classifying such expressions are on the right
track, a distinction between tensed and tenseless in—
terrogatives seems to require having already distinguished
tensed from tenseless declaratives. And it is the class
of declarative sentences, after all, in which philoso-
phers concerned with the tensed/tenseless distinction
have been interested.
Thus far, I have not considered whether sentences
other than declaratives and interrogatives for example,
imperatives and performatives—deserve to be classified
as tensed or tenseless. Offhand, it would not seem
so.
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Granted, imperatives have a kind of future force , since
one cannot be commanded to do something in time that
has already elapsed, and performatives have a kind of
present force. But in neither case do we seem to have
the sorts of contrasts that we can find in the class of
interrogatives—that is, contrasts analogous to 'Did
John cp?
* ,
'Will John cp?', 'Is John cping?', and 'Is red
a color?'. It is difficult to imagine, for example,
what a tenseless imperative would be, as opposed to a
standard imperative like 'Do such-and-such 1 ' . Thus,
while imperatives and performatives are certainly worth
examining in other contexts, I think they may be passed
over here.
The Tenseless Analyses Reconsidered
I suggested in the last chapter that, assuming
that it made sense to say that verbs have temporal im-
port, it appeared that certain verbs cannot be stripped
entirely of their temporal connotations, or somehow
rendered temporally insignificant. Thus 'dines m
73See pp. 86-87, PP- 90ff.
(68) (Et)(t is earlier than & John
dines with Mary at t)
might not be atemporal.
j also observed that some philosophers would
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construe 'dines' as an omnitemooral verb—that is, as
an abbreviation for 'dined or dines or will dine'. But
in this case, X noted, 'dines' in (68) is a tensed verb.
Thus if 'dines' in (68) is regarded as an omnitemporal
verb, the second conjunct in (68) must change truth-
conditions with each successive replication, like other
omnitemporal sentences, since the periods of time de-
termining which of the three abbreviated tensed verbs
is appropriate for a given replication of (68) must
change from moment to moment. At some times the second
conjunct will be satisfied because John dined wi^n Iiary
at t, and at other times because John will dine with
Mary at t. And even if there sire two different moments
at which, say, the future—tense component of the omni-
temporal 'dines' is applicable, the period Oj. uime in
virtue of which that component is applicable at one
moment is not identical with the period of time in
virtue of which the future-tense component is applicable
at another moment.
Thus, since the second conjunct in (68) is tensed,
(68) is a hybrid and therefore is tensed as well.
Similar results are obtained if the verb 'is' in
(69) John's dining with Mary is earlier
than
is likewise taken to be omnitemporal. Regardless
of
148
how we fill in the blank (e.g., with 'now', or a token-
reflexive, or a date), (69) with an omnitemporal 'is'
has truth-conditions which must change from moment to
moment like those of the second conjunct in (73)
•
But this is not the only respect in which the
schemata for the tenseless patterns of analysis turn
75
out to be tensed. For example philosophers'^ who mam-
^Like Quine: [Q2], Duncan-Jones : [D33.
tain that the blank in schemata like
(17) (Et)(t [is] later than (simultaneous with,
earlier than) & John [is] fat at t)
(10") The glass’s being full [is] earlier
than
should be replaced by the word ’now’ , are also providing
awkward tensed analyses of tensed sentences.
To take the simple case, (10"), by substituting
’now’ for the blank, the truth-conditions of (10") turn
out to be the truth-conditions of
(10) The glass was full
Both sentences are true if and only if the glass is full
at some time prior to the time of the sentence s pro-
duction.
And in the case of (17) » "the truth-conditions of
the first conjunct would be the truth-conditions of a
tensed sentence, turning (17) into a hybrid, and thus
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into a tensed sentence. Taking the first conjunct to
read 't [is] later than now', this conjunct is true if
and only if t is some time later than the time of pro-
duction. Thus the truth-conditions of this conjunct
must change from moment to moment as do the truth-con-
ditions of other future-tensed sentences, since the
period of time counting as subsequent to the production
of that conjunct changes with each successive replica-
tion.
Moreover it seems that similar results are obtained
by substituting the token-reflexive expression, 'this
utterance', for the blank in (17) and (10”)« We had
intimations of this ironic result m onapuer Ii,
76Cf., pp. 71-72.
where it was observed that some substitutions for the
blank in the tenseless analyses did not yield sentences
that were freely repeatable.
It appears, then, that many proponents of tense-
less analyses were quite unsuccessful in oxfering a means
for re—expressing tensed sentences that avoided the
semantic peculiarities of those sentences. For example,
we certainly do not avoid the truth—value instability
of
(19) John was fat
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by re-expressing it as either
(102) (Et)(t [is] earlier than now (this
utterance 8c John [is] fat at t)
or
(105) John’s being fat [is] earlier than now
(this utterance)
At a time prior to John’s birth, all three sentences
are false ((102), of course, is false because its second
conjunct is false), although they would be true after
fat John's death.
As I observed in Chapter II, the most promising
means of keeping the tenseless analyses tenseless is
to substitute a date or time-coordinate for the blank
in our schemata. Many of the philosophers discussed
earlier endorse such a position (if only some of the
time) But it is not clear that they see the ad-
^See, for exajnple, pp. 12-15*
vantage of using dates rather than token-reflexives or
'now'
.
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CONCLUSION
The theory of tensed sentences offered in the
previous chapter is by no means complete. I have, for
the most part, avoided discussion of issues the adequate
treatment of which would have required lengthy digres-
sions to other thorny matters. Notably, I have not
examined in any detail the sense in which replicas of
a tensed sentence, or differently tensed versions of
a tensed sentence, can advance the same claim.
But my primary concerns have been, first, to put
certain well-entrenched prejudices about tensed sentences
(namely, those concerning free repeatability and the
temporal import of verbs) in their proper perspective,
and secondly, to offer what I regard as an accurate
account of the distinction between tensed and tense-
less sentences. Since distinctions between tensed and
tenseless sentences based on some of these prejudices
have been used to support certain other philosophical
views, it would be interesting to see whether these
other views would survive an analysis of tensed sen-
tences such as I have proposed. For example, it would
be interesting to see whether a comprehensive tenseless
language can be constructed, given the misgivings ex-
pressed earlier about de-tensing verbs (that is, depriving
152
them of temporal import).
In any case, it should be of intrinsic interest
that we can distinguish these two classes of sentences
on the basis of their truth-conditions, and in parti-
cular, that the truth-conditions of tensed sentences
are relativized to the times of their production, while
those of tenseless sentences are not.
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